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Project Design Flood: 1958 plans by the US Army Corps of Engineers for a maximum 
capacity flood on the Mississippi, including all major federally-maintained structures. 
3 
 
 
 
 
Dedicated to Mr. Chamberlin and Delp.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
There are too many people to thank for this project. 
 
Firstly, thank you to Susan Rogers for your enduring support, and to the rest of my board – 
Yuka Suzuki and Peter Klein, for critiques and odd-hour meetings. Thank you to the Bard 
EUS Department and the Lytle family for funding my fieldwork. 
 
Endless thanks to Ginny Hanusik and Emily Wolff for hosting me in New Orleans. Especially 
Ginny, who has been an incredible friend and a helpful eye into the water world of 
Louisiana. Thank you to everybody I encountered in January – Richard Campanella of 
Tulane University, Francis Aguillard of Waggonner and Ball Architects, Dr. Chris Brantley of 
the Bonnet Carré Spillway, Rob Holmes of the Dredge Research Collaborative, the staff of 
Propeller, the archivists at the Historic New Orleans Collection, the USGS office in Baton 
Rouge, and countless others. 
 
Thank you to all my professors at Bard, who have tentatively allowed me to tread the lines 
between literature, history, anthropology, ecology and urban studies. In other words, EUS. 
 
Finally, thank you to my closest supporters – my parents, my brother, and Mr. Tony 
Haouam. 
 
4 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Introduction  
 Encounters         5 
 Infrastructure and the Delta      12 
Chapter 1: Imaginations        20  
Chapter 2: Structures         
 I. Fixing the Riverbed: The Levee Debate     30 
 II. Sentry to the North: The Bonnet Carré Spillway   36 
 III. Rewilding the Delta: The Morganza Floodway    47 
 IV. Atchafalaya Revisited: Old River Control    53 
Chapter 3: Scaling Up 
 Venice, Louisiana        60 
Conclusion: Scaling Down        79 
 
 
          
Appendix: Additional Images       86 
Bibliography          94 
 
 
 
5 
 
Introduction  
Encounters 
 The first time I encountered the Mississippi, it was at The Fly, a riverfront 
portion of Audubon Park on the western, uptown side of New Orleans. Its grassy 
lawns, flanked with live oaks, end in a short concrete embankment along the water. 
Below the embankment, there are various forms of erosion control – a step of wire 
cages full of stones and schist, leafy stretches of batture forest. They're not the first 
thing you see, though. You see the river looming broad and flat.  
 At this point (January 2014), I hadn't spent much time on waterfronts in the 
city. When I saw water, it was sluiced through militaristic canals on the east side, or 
flushed into storm drains in the Central Business District. Always it was channeled 
and revetted through concrete passages or pooled up in grassy ditches, out of sight 
and mind. All of the places I confronted water in New Orleans seemed to be highly 
controlled situations, even City Park with its "wild" stretches of artificial bayou. 
Initially this made sense to me – here we have a major city in the middle of the 
largest deltaic complex in North America. This is a river known, above all else, for its 
temperament and massive flood events – which formed the very sedimentary plain 
that New Orleans was founded on. Of course water in the urban landscape will 
always be somehow predicated by infrastructure, be cosmetic. Encountering water 
in the city will always be a designed experience. The parks, the outfall canals, the 
levees are recreational, but the way they are built tells us how engineers and 
planners perceive the river – a hostile force. 
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 I remember thinking, while driving over NOLA's canals and drainage ditches, 
of the dry, concrete bed of the Los Angeles River, winding through the city empty 
and forlorn, an artifact of California's ongoing drought. I remember flying into 
Phoenix over the Central Arizona Project, a 336-mile canal carrying water from the 
Colorado River out to arid cities across the Sonoran Desert, most of it evaporating 
along the way. These massive western projects support city ecologies that grow 
increasingly difficult to water. They suffer from huge misconceptions about what it 
means to "green" the urban landscape – enormous amounts of groundwater are 
wasted on non-native grass species, almonds and swimming pools. These cities 
highlight the ridiculousness of placing urban hubs in ecologies that fundamentally 
reject development, which lack the basic local resources to sustain a large human 
population. They agglomerate vast populations, economies, cultures: they can't be 
moved.  
 This is the exact opposite of the problem New Orleans and its fellow cities 
along the Gulf Coast currently face. In Louisiana, the high-stakes environmental 
issue is the rising tide. The coast is slowly sinking into the Gulf, and it's a well-
known fact that almost half of the city of New Orleans has gradually subsided below 
sea level. Some of it has to do with infrastructure. All of it has to do with the 
Mississippi River, and the various attempts to control its notorious floods and 
watery inundations, from first human contact with the land. 
 That Sunday at the Fly I remember thinking that the Mississippi, broad and 
plain under a gray January sky, looked somehow naked. The river's width can create 
the impression that the water is moving slowly. In fact, about 600,000 cubic feet of 
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water move by the Fly each second. It's about a half a mile wide here. At Algier's 
Point, the river measures 200 feet to the muddy bottom. Across the English Turn, 
there is another revitalized waterfront called Crescent Park, the first section of 
which opened in 2013. The purpose of such parks in the city – the Fly, the Crescent, 
and Woldenberg Park (in the French Quarter) – are intended to foster recreation, 
civil movement and health in the city. They also frame an encounter between the 
citizen and the river. In almost every park, there is a stark border between the grass, 
pathway, and the Mississippi's running water, seperated only by a thin concrete line. 
A park in New Orleans is not the traditional sort of monolithic river control that this 
project will mainly look at, but it serves as a good introduction. New Orleans' parks 
offer a more everyday lens into designers' interactions with the river, and how that 
design is influenced by their perceptions of the river's ecology. The park's design, in 
turn, influences public experience of the river as bucolic, threatening, or some 
hybrid territory. New Orleans' most-visited park is situated where all the tourists 
go: the French Quarter.  
 Woldenberg Park is a strip of greenery and concrete walkway on top of a 
concrete and earthen levee, with a rocky embankment leading down into the river. 
There are a few monuments to immigrants, to soldiers, built in the 1980s, which 
look like solidified WPA drawings. Sometimes there are music festivals in the plaza. 
Woldenberg is an outlet for the drunk and sober, native and tourist overflow of the 
French Quarter, to escape the grid and eat their beignets in the salt wind. However, 
it is first and foremost a giant levee. The entire park is hemmed to the river shore by 
the city's rail line (RTA), busy with street cars and large chemical train shipments, 
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transporting commerce and tourists along the river's edge. Its border with the 
Mississippi is a distinctively rough edge descending in a scramble of boulders. 
Mostly, people run along the path, out of direct contact with the river. But there is 
one prominent structure along its floodwall – a set of roughly hewn wooden 
bleachers leading down to the water. The High Line in New York has a similar 
feature, with wooden bleachers facing a glass window above 10th Avenue, framing 
the every day traffic of bicycles, pedestrians and cars in Chelsea.  
 The metaphor is clear – it casts you as an audience member in a daily, urban 
theater of economy and commute. In New Orleans, this theater is the Mississippi. 
The expanse of brownish-green water extends in either direction, banked with 
articulated concrete revetments cast in a row field in St. Francisville, LA. To the left, 
the river is bisected by the Crescent City Connection, a cantilever bridge crossing 
into Gretna, and the Governor Nichols Street Wharf, one of four major cargo holding 
facilities in the city core. To the right, imitation steamboat barges, ocean liners and 
Panamax container ships troll through the channel. That's what the river seems like 
here – less of a river, more of a channel, a canal, a passageway for inner- and inter-
continental trade. Brief ribbons of recreational greenspace extend along the river's 
edge only in affluent neighborhoods – the French Quarter (Woldenberg), Carrollton 
(the Fly), and most recently, the rapidly gentrifying Bywater district. The romance 
of Mark Twain's Mississippi and the promise of adventure it holds seems largely 
gone this far south – the river seems less landscape than infrastructure. 
 In Bywater, the first stretch of Crescent Park opened in 2014. It was designed 
in response to a citywide competition called "Reinventing the Crescent," signed on 
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in 2008 by then-mayor Ray Nagin (now sentenced to 10 years in federal prison for 
bribery and money laundering, among other crimes in Katrina's aftermath). The 
intent of this competition was ostensibly to get New Orleans' major architecture 
firms to redesign the entire New Orleans waterfront as a single connected arc of 
parkspace (thus, "crescent"). The plan is coming together piecemeal – the next 
extension, from Mazant Street onward, is due to open in 2015. The first band of 
park, from Elysian Fields to Mazant, has received largely positive popular response. 
Doug McCash, writing for the Times-Picayune a few days after its February opening, 
called it a "sevefire masterpiece," with its repurposed Piety Wharf displaying the 
"untamed edge of the surging river [as] an open wound [...] with a certain welcome 
edginess" (McCash). This language is iterated in many discussions of the Mississippi 
– the vocabulary of riverfront encounters is one of precarity, possible danger.  
 To enter the park, you have to cross a giant pedestrian bridge made of 
repurposed metal, which arcs over Bywater's concrete floodwall and an active 
railroad line. It was designed by starchitect David Adjaye from Washington, D.C., in 
collaboration with New Orleans' Eskew+Dumez+Ripple, and Hargreaves Associates 
of Boston. It's true – as McCash suggests, once you enter the park, you are in 
"untamed" territory. In this way the park operates on two levels, beyond 
infrastructure and recreation – it's a bucolic expanse of gardens containing native 
flowering plants and reeds, and a militaristic, harsh-angled wharf built over the 
ruined pilings of a destroyed railroad. By leaving the edge of the river raw, unaltered 
save the same kind of informal stone levee at Woldenberg, it reminds the parkgoer 
of a difficult history of river control. Its progressiveness lies in the fact that it gives 
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multiple identities to the same space. Most forms of river control in Louisiana, as 
this project will address, are skeins over the complicated history of watery 
inundations and  various attempts to staunch them. Here, the pilings stand. 
 
Fig. 1. Stepped levee design feature for the Crescent by Eskew+Dumez+Ripple (2008). 
 
 This tension between the history of the landscape and the infrastructure that 
has subsumed it has become one of my central interests through research for this 
project. It is almost always a problem of uncomfortable scaling – the infrastructure 
rearticulates the land quite literally as it affects the distribution of sediment across 
the delta. It simultaneously represents the levee, the revetment's local effect on any 
particular riverfront, and also uniform attempts to do the same thing on almost 
every inhabited waterfront community in southern Louisiana (i.e., every 
community). Discussion of the levee system or the trophic effects of river diversions 
require the kind of thinking in "deep time" that John McPhee discusses in Basin and 
Range (1981). In this book, discussing geological scale, he proposes that "deep time" 
is not a system of comprehension but measurement: "On the geologic time scale, a 
human lifetime is reduced to a brevity that is too inhibiting to think about. The mind 
blocks the information" (McPhee 127). Deep time is a kind of personal reconciliation 
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with the fact that one's field of study, while scientific in nature and subject to 
academic scrutiny of measurement and method, is almost entirely invisible, etched 
into the surface of an earth millions of years ago.  
 The joy of Louisiana's geology lies in its youth. It's not so deep after all. The 
sedimentary mat (alluvium) that southern Louisiana sits on is only about 7,000 
years old. It is built off of the continental shelf by the Mississippi's outmoded LBM 
(Land-Building Machine), which for thousands of years spewed sediment into a Gulf 
stream much slower than its own current – so the sediment settled, accumulated 
wetlands, and formed the deltaic plain. With the advent of digital imaging, LandSat 
rasters available for public download from the USGS, GoogleMaps, etc. – this kind of 
telescopic thinking has become more everyday. In the political map on your phone 
or on the web, the southern border of Louisiana remains static. In actuality, those 
young wetlands are rapidly receding into the Gulf. This is in part a result of the way 
the river has been engineered via levees, spillways, diversions and countless other 
forms of landscape technologies.  
 In these structures lies a central predicament: they both enable people to live 
way out on the deltaic plain (New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and a constellation of 
smaller towns depend on them), but they are also assisting its slow erosion. They 
are both false friends and completely necessary. This project will teeter on that fact. 
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Infrastructure and the Delta 
 In Italo Calvino's "Invisible Cities," a young Marco Polo describes episodes of 
his travels to the emperor of the Mongol Empire, Kublai Khan, attempting to win his 
favor. Urbanists love to cite various parts of this book to use as metaphors for 
whatever city they're looking at. One of my favorite passages, under "Cities and the 
Sky," describes a place called Thekla: 
Those who arrive at Thekla can see little of the city, beyond the plank fences, 
the sackcloth screens, the scaffoldings, the metal armatures, the wooden 
catwalks hanging from ropes or supported by sawhorses, the ladders, the 
trestles. If you ask "Why is Thekla's construction taking such a long time?" 
the inhabitants continue hoisting sacks, lowering leaded strings, moving long 
brushes up and down, as they answer, "So that its destruction cannot begin." 
And if asked whether they fear that, once the scaffoldings are removed, the 
city may begin to crumble and fall to pieces, they add hastily, in a whisper, 
"Not only the city." 
If, dissatisfied with the answers, someone puts his eye to a crack in a fence, 
he sees cranes pulling up other cranes, scaffoldings that embrace other 
scaffoldings, beams that prop up other beams. "What meaning does your 
construction have?" he asks. "What is the aim of a city under construction 
unless it is a city? Where is the plan you are following, the blueprint?" 
"We will show it to you as soon as the working day is over; we cannot 
interrupt our work now," they answer. 
Work stops at sunset. Darkness falls over the building site. The sky is filled 
with stars. "There is the blueprint," they say.        
(Calvino 127) 
 
 Thekla is a city made entirely of infrastructure. It has no other components – 
no houses, stores, or town hall, just framework and passageways, none seemingly 
marked, all intuitive. Its unending construction is directed by a starry imperative to 
expand and network. It's as if Thekla is the vast support system for another, internal 
city which will never exist, no matter how deep into the scaffolding you go. It can 
only exist in a state of constant construction because construction is the only work 
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available to its inhabitants. Infrastructure is its culture, its reason for existence. 
These workers operate under a divine order from the heavens (much like Manifest 
Destiny) to add framework. The slowly shifting pattern of stars is not just their 
blueprint, but their motivation, their employer and mentor, the only force driving 
them on in their Sisyphean work – forever pushing a boulder up a hill only to watch 
it roll back to the bottom. It reminds me, unequivocally, of New Orleans. If Thekla's 
citizens stop building and updating their support system, it will fall apart – same 
goes for the Army Corps of Engineers. 
 What would New Orleans be without its levees, without the networked 
system of flood control along the river, stretching up to St. Louis? Now, virtually the 
entire city is below sea level, which is an anthropogenic condition – the land outside 
the natural levee of the river, denied its yearly inundation of sediment during spring 
floods, slowly sank below grade. Further – what would New Orleans be without the 
vast, networked river control system scattered along the Mississippi to the north, all 
the way to Arkansas? Louisiana would return to its original growth state, before the 
first French and Spanish colonies of the 1700s – a cypress-dominated marshland, an 
ever-expanding estuary with freshwater currents, an alluvial plain steadily growing 
to the size of the Nile's delta.  
 The Mississippi River delta is, as John McPhee described it, an "upside-down 
superhimalaya," a natural phenomenon like no other in the Americas (McPhee 3). 
Superhimalayas are the hilly roller coasters that rocket you along a small circuit, the 
kind at county fairs. This is to say that the Mississippi isn't a static object of nature – 
it's a river that shifts drastically over the landscape with the change in distribution 
14 
 
of sediment and gravity. If the Mississippi River has many characters, operates as 
many different kinds of protagonists, the Dynamo is one of these personalities – the 
river as it existed before its concrete constraints and military mandates. The 
Dynamo personality is a true agent of what William Cronon defines as "wilderness:" 
a thickly social construction of nature, combining sublime beauty with the spiteful 
hand of God, a "sacred" place with a "primitive" temper (Cronon 5). However, the 
wilderness Cronon writes about are benign natural tracts that have become famous 
in the American imagination – Hetch Hetchy, Yellowstone, the Adirondacks, etc. – 
protected from the likes of John Muir and other conservationists in the late 1800s. 
These were placed perceived as "temples," havens of the good spirit of nature. The 
Mississippi's malignness, perhaps, is what opens it to thick development, to 
surveillance and control at an unimaginable scale.  
 Wherever the river goes, it brings that uncertain encounter with it, that 
capacity always to breach its shores and flood the land. All attempts to make 
permanent settlement in the southern half of Louisiana, Acadiana, have been 
contingent on the river's precarity. At the same time, it is impossible for there not to 
be a major American city on this fringe territory – New Orleans is situated at the 
mouth of the largest single American river. For this reason, Peirce Lewis has 
described it as "the impossible but inevitable city" (Paleo 20). New Orleans is the 
trade post that sees everything going in and out of mainland America, everything in 
the boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase – all the way north to current-day South 
Dakota, east and west as far as the watershed extends, encompassing more than half 
the continent. The "birdfoot" mouth of the river, named so for its forking channels 
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reaching out into the Gulf was originally a wide, shallow plain of sediment, thickly 
shifting out into the slower saltwater territory. Now it is a deep, dredged channel, 
trafficked by barges.  
• • • 
  This project wishes to examine past and present forms of river control in the 
Mississippi delta, identify their macro-effects on the coastal ecology of Louisiana, 
and their micro-effects on city planning in New Orleans. It's therefore a project 
about uncomfortable shifts in scale – comparing the evolution of an entire coastal 
ecology to the evolution of a street plan, the encounter framed by a park or a canal. 
Such an analysis requires an extraordinary amount of backwork through history, 
legislation, trade relations between early colonists, native inhabitants of the coast, 
political refugees, slaves, wooden structures long flushed away by the river, and 
environmental racism laid out across the land. It's a big topic, and I don't want to 
attempt the form of an ethnography or historiography unsuccessfully.  
 Instead, I'd like to take a cue from Brian Larkin and focus on the "poetic 
mode" of infrastructure – the everyday intersections of water, social processes and 
technology, told in a fragmented narrative similar to actual lived experience (Larkin 
335). Over the month of January 2015, I visited New Orleans and spent my days 
traveling between various river control structures in the city and across southern 
Louisiana. These include the Bonnet Carré Spillway, the Morganza Floodway, the 
Old River Control complex, and various sites of levee crevasses, pumping station 
failures, and watery inundations of all kinds, inside New Orleans and out. At these 
sites, I interviewed biologists and engineers in the US Army Corps of Engineers 
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(USACE), digital mapping experts in the USGS, and landscape architects dealing with 
water in New Orleans – all members of a very large and diverse task force of 
organizations charged with the maintenance of old infrastructure and the imagining 
of a new system. 
 In the poetic mode, Larkin writes, "form is loosened from technical function. 
Infrastructures are the means by which a state proffers these representations to its 
citizens and asks them to take those representations as social facts" (335). In other 
words, infrastructure is something people are taught to look past, to take advantage 
of as a civic given – a dam as something to drive over, a sewer as something that 
doesn't exist anywhere outside the imagination (until it malfunctions). Larkin also 
notes that we often privilege the end effect of infrastructure – "we often see 
computers not cables, light not electricity, taps and water but not pipes and sewers" 
(329).  When Le Corbusier wrote "Eyes That Do Not See," in Toward An Architecture 
(1923) his elegy to ocean liners, airplanes and cars, he wished to create a more 
plastic definition for architecture to include objects symbolic of the industrial age – 
icons of globalization and mass production. In urban theory today, the word 
infrastructure has come into its own vogue and experienced a similar widening of its 
definition. Kazys Varnelis has argued that Le Corbusier's phrase – eyes that do not 
see – is useful for infrastructure precisely because it's something made invisible, 
built into the walls and under the streets. This project will be an attempt to look 
with fresh eyes at the familiar, the banal structures of concrete and steel that have 
reconstituted the landscape and urban imaginaries of southern Louisiana – the 
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levees, revetments, spillways, blast-plugs, floodwalls, locks, chevrons, cutoffs, 
dredge and drainage projects. 
 The word "infrastructure" itself can mean any number of things. In simple 
terms, infrastructure is an "architecture of circulation," a series of physical 
structures aiding the flow of goods, people or ideas, or more generally, "matter 
enabling the movement of other matter" (329). Or restricting movement, 
streamlining movement, editing movement, inhabiting any number of temporary 
switch-and-bait roles depending on the river's flood level.  
 There's water infrastructure of the sort I'll be looking at in detail, but there's 
also informational infrastructure evolving simultaneously. The French geographer 
Elisée Reclus, boating into New Orleans for the first time in 1853, noted with 
surprise that before they passed a single settlement on the coast, he noticed a 
telephone wire extending into the distance. He remarked, with distaste, that in this 
muddy wilderness, "science seems out of place [...] here, on soggy ground that is not 
even part of the continent yet, but only the residue of waves, the telegraph is the 
first work of humans" (Reclus 41). Far before the boom and boon of the coastal 
fishing industry, an information-based economy was already vital to New Orleans' 
existence as a trade post. This is infrastructure aiding the networked system of 
merchants, monitoring the traffic of ships and foreign cargo entering and exiting the 
river. In addition to being an unsightly reminder of the frontier economy, Reclus 
also notes that the wires were largely inefficient, routinely knocked down by Cuban 
cows brought there by immigrant farmers. 
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  Walter Benjamin called infrastructure the "collective fantasy of society" – an 
architecture of desire, an enabling mechanism that allows the rest of society to 
function smoothly, aided by an invisible support system (Larkin 328). According to 
Benjamin, infrastructures, despite their apparent inertia, express communal desires 
almost entirely separate from their concrete, technical functions. What desire is 
expressed by a levee? The simple desire not to have one's home flooded, but 
perhaps also a shared desire to best nature, as John McPhee has suggested in a 
landmark 1987 essay "Atchafalaya." River control, he suggests, functions basically as 
a military offense against nature, an Army Corps stronghold tasked with the defense 
of everybody living in the Mississippi delta (or at least those within the levees).  
 How else might we define infrastructure? It is also a "mechanism to control 
time," according to Graham and Marvin – in the case of the Mississippi, river control 
wishes to keep the river perpetually flowing along the same course it travelled in 
the 1800s, at the time of New Orleans' settlement (332). It is simultaneously a 
military project, a project of controlling sight, a project of circulation dependent on 
constant efficiency, a tool to measure a society's functionality. In Louisiana, it 
attempts to make sense a messy ecology into a system where every last drop of 
water and sediment are weighed and accounted for: an impossible but inevitable 
task. 
• • • 
 Delta is not just a geological feature but a mathematical symbol signifying 
change over time. It's represented by a triangle. This is useful  
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– it turns a simple pronoun into an equation, a sentence with action. The Mississippi 
River ∆. The Mississippi River changes over time. So do its people, their houses, their 
streets, bridges and dams, agriculture and economy, in conversation with the river. 
The delta is flat – it's not a landscape that can be stood above and looked out over, to 
see whether a barrier island has disappeared that was there a year ago. The changes 
in such a place can be drastic, but perception and evaluation of them is  slow to the 
draw.  
 The first section of this project will look at early accounts of the delta and its 
various technologies from French and Spanish geographers, traders, travelers, 
engineers, and the often-ignored population that maintained the levees until 1849: 
West African and Native American slaves working on sugar and cotton plantations 
along the river, Cajun, Creole and immigrant populations. It will track the history of 
specific river-control projects and their different articulations as they switched from 
private to public hands: from willow to concrete, from provisional to permanent 
constructions. 
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Chapter 1: Imaginations  
Imaginations of the Mississippi 
 I was born and raised in Savannah, GA. As with New Orleans, visitors talk 
wistfully of it as a sleepy southern town, existing somehow outside the political 
functions of the rest of the country. People are supposed to be kinder, operating 
under a code of hospitality symbolized by the pineapple – an exotic fruit endemic to 
the Caribbean, adopted by European colonists as a false symbol of good intentions. 
In wealthy neighborhoods, you see pineapples on doorsteps or embroidered into 
curtains and upholstery. Above you are live oak trees bearded with Spanish moss, 
whose hundred-year-old roots fracture and burst through the 21st-century asphalt. 
These are the Southern Gothic images that sell on postcards, alongside images of 
carriages bumping along the cobblestone roads of River Street – the cobblestones 
didn't actually come from Savannah but from the northeast, ship ballast used as 
cheap and convenient paving material. 
 One of the most prominent features of Savannah is its squares – a grid of 
twenty-four green spaces inspired from the designs of old Turin and redevelopment 
in London after the fire of 1666. Twenty-three squares, now that one's been cleared 
to build a parking garage. They're bordered by one-way roads that create a 
functional circulation of traffic without stoplights. James Oglethorpe (whose name 
now lives on in a shopping mall out in the boonies) was the British general who 
drafted the plan in 1733, about a hundred years after the first French settlement of 
New Orleans.  
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 Both cities bear the visible character of military settlements – New Orleans' 
original plan was a symmetrical sixty-six block grid bordered by the signature star-
shaped walls of French prisons and forts. This proto-grid is the current-day French 
Quarter, elevated from floods on the natural levee of the Mississippi. Along the shore 
grew batture forests, consisting mostly of black willows and cottonwoods, both 
fluvial trees thriving off of constant inundation in water. Behind the natural levee, 
the land mostly sloped off into slightly lower wetlands – porous land dominated by 
bald cypress.  
 Growing up, Savannah and New Orleans seemed like sister cities to me, 
sharing so much of the same visual culture, food and wetland species of grass and 
amphibious fauna. My paternal grandmother, Irma Lee Pittman, came from Amite, 
LA (just north of New Orleans), and drove back every December to deliver a 
Christmas sermon in Cajun dialect at her childhood church. Her parents were killed 
in the 1908 Dixie tornado outbreak that tore apart most of the town. One of the only 
undamaged items in the otherwise torn-apart house was a Dutch girl quilt, which 
Irma Lee later cut up and divided among her six children. A piece of it is framed in 
our laundry room, the bonnet and apron stitched in faded pinks and greens. My 
grandfather, Harry Rollings, received his medical training at Charity Hospital, the 
oldest free teaching hospital in America. They married and moved to Savannah. In 
2005, only a few years after each of their deaths, about half of the city of New 
Orleans flooded after the I-walls on several outfall canals burst with storm surge 
from Hurricane Katrina. Charity Hospital weathered severe flooding, with a small 
team of German doctors taking care of the patients who weren't able to escape in 
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time. Now the hospital is permanently closed despite its structural integrity, and 
subject to a citywide debate about what to do with it – Mayor Mitch Landrieu 
proposed renovating it as city hall, a team of activists behind the documentary "Big 
Charity" continue to rally for its reopening as a public hospital. Plans for its 
destruction as part of a neighborhood-wide clearance project to build a new LSU-VA 
teaching hospital complex were shot down last year, leaving hundreds of people 
without homes in a demolished historic district near mid-City. Amite, LA was torn 
apart again this past December by another congregation of tornadoes ushered south 
from the plains (Sanchez 1). More than a dozen families moved away from 
Tangipahoa Parish. Goes to show – even in northern Louisiana, away from the brunt 
of storm surge flooding and erosion, natural disasters still fluke the landscape, 
displacing vulnerable communities. 
 The Dynamo characterization of the Mississippi is unpredictable: it redirects 
over a hundred-mile radius at the tip of a hat, its current runs upstream for a night, 
its oxbows bend so steeply that they cut off. The town of Delta is three miles below 
Vicksburg one year, the next year it's two miles above (Twain 5). Picture a jar of 
Mississippi water, freshly sluiced from a floodgate – a mythological substance. It's a 
dense greenish-brown, filled with suspended matter that dances around in 
Brownian motion – sediment settling into a gradient, gravel, small benthic 
organisms in various stages of development, petrochemical runoff, decayed bits of 
fish flesh, clay. It smells neutral, earthen – or somewhat like mildew if there's been 
an chemically-triggered algae bloom nearby, increasingly common along the 
American Ruhr. There's a tradition among riverdogs of tasting the sediment for 
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good luck. Now it's avoided, a notoriously chemical sludge from Baton Rouge 
southward. 
 This thick water comes from a river that is intensely alive, in the sense of Jane 
Bennett's "vibrant matter." It's matter that, through its popular personifications, 
takes on a role as actor in the human world – a substance with agency. Bennet notes 
" ... that we are much better at admitting that humans infect nature than we are at 
admitting that nonhumanity infects culture, for the latter entails the blasphemous 
idea that nonhumans – trash, bacteria, stem cells, food, technologies, weather – are 
actants more than objects" (Bennett 115). The Mississippi, too is perceived as a 
nonhuman force driven over the vast gradient of mainland America by gravity alone. 
Its drainage basin ranges from western New York state to Idaho, making it 
responsible for the drainage of unimaginable quantities of water. It's a lawless entity 
transcending political boundaries – a wall of reinforced concrete means as little to it 
as the state line between Louisiana and Mississippi, which snakes along its path, 
changing as it does. It moves over some of the flattest land in America, but never 
lazily. At all times, it merely follows the path of least resistance to the Gulf with 
shifts in the land, traveling in and among human constructions. 
 The characterizations go on: the river is personified as devilish, scheming, 
intelligent, opportunistic, two-faced and deeply charismatic. It is also Twain's 
bucolic river, representative of freedom and true, untamed wilderness. Geologically, 
it's also relatively young – younger than the Rocky Mountains, and just about the 
"youthfulest batch of country that lies around there anywhere" (Twain 5). Yet in the 
time of its existence, it has switchbacked over nearly the entire states of Louisiana, 
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depositing sediment and forming vast new territories of wetland extending out into 
the Gulf of Mexico. Here is how historian John Barry describes its current, in his 
account of the 1927 flood: 
The Mississippi never lies at rest. It roils. It follows no set course. Its waters 
and currents are not uniform. Rather, it moves south in layers and whorls, 
like an uncoiling rope made up of a multitude of discrete fibers, each one 
following an independent and unpredictable path, each one separately and 
together capable of snapping like a whip.    (Barry 38) 
 
The Gulf Stream is a gentle lull in comparison. Most of the sediment that is not 
carried out to Florida and up the eastern seaboard simply settles along the 
Louisiana coast – it is a giant Land-Building Machine (LBM). It is an river that, 
according to Twain, "is always changing its habit bodily – it is always moving bodily 
sidewise" (Twain 5). It is a restless current with an almost corporeal presence. 
 Its currents will sometimes be intensely landscaped by river technologies, 
and sometimes completely obliterate them. Because of its personality, it does this 
not just as a function of physics, or pressure, but supposedly as an act of rebellion. 
Take river cut-offs. Straightening the river was one of the Army Corps of Engineers' 
major projects in the early 1900's, in order to reduce the amount of time and energy 
it took barges to navigate the great looping turns of the river. Wherever the river 
threw out oxbow bends, the USACE dug a channel between the two closest edges of 
the river, cementing each edge with dikes to keep it from flooding during 
construction. Often the dikes would be outfitted with "blast-plugs" to let the river 
flow in and destroy the structure when the time was right – or, they would simply 
be blown up with dynamite, letting the river divert its flow to the shorter path. 128 
such cut-offs occurred between the years of 1930 and 1942 under the direction of 
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Corps director James Buchanan Eads, shortening the river by almost 150 miles 
(Barry). Studies conducted by the Corps had suggested this process would also 
drastically reduce yearly floods, killing two birds with one stone. Its skeptics feared 
that in doing so, meander cut-offs would also deepen the channel of the river, 
denying the coastal region of Louisiana its yearly inundation of sediment.  
 
Fig. 1: Manufactured river cut-off (USGS). 
 Meander cut-offs are a project that the river also naturally emulates through 
time. Occasionally its oxbows, stretched to a ridiculous angle, will cut themselves off 
through years of erosion and flooding, turning the parenthetical body of water into 
an oxbow lake, which may gradually dry out without flooding. 
    
Fig. 2: Oxbow cut-off (Radical Cartography). 
 Many river control practices do the same: edit the landscape by emulating 
natural processes, but collapsing them in time. Constructed levees, on one hand, are 
merely a reinforced mimicry of the river's natural levees. Revetments (which in the 
26 
 
1930's consisted mostly of willow mattresses laid down on the river banks, now 
made of articulated concrete links) are merely a reinforced riverbank, one that 
doesn't allow for erosion or change. They are intended as permanent versions of the 
geological forms the river has "naturally" created over hundreds of years – built, 
primarily, to preserve the river's path as it existed in the early 1900's. In doing so, 
these technologies preserved the communities that thrived off its commerce. Above 
the entrance to the engineering school at the University of Wyoming, there is a 
sandstone plaque etched with the words: "STRIVE ON – THE CONTROL OF NATURE 
IS WON, NOT GIVEN." John McPhee noticed a version of this etched into the belt 
buckle of a river engineer named LeRoy Dugas, or "Dugie," in 1989, an iteration of 
the manifesto: "TO HELP CONTROL THE MISSISSIPPI" (McPhee 13). It might as 
easily read, To preserve the Mississippi circa 1950, forever. 
 The river must move an incredible amount of water through a landscape that 
has not been carved out for it by glaciers, and because of this exercises great 
freedom in redirecting to whichever route is most geographically convenient at the 
moment – and there are few barriers that keep it from throwing out oxbows to test 
for a slightly steeper gradient. Or, with the gradual shift in distribution of sediment 
across the state of Louisiana, it will simply begin diverting its waters into a tributary 
until the original path of the river is a shadow of its former self. The entire southern 
portion of Louisiana has been formed by these deviations.  
 Harold Fisk, a cartographer commissioned by the US Army Corps of 
Engineers in 1944 to map the river's lineage, immortalized these overlapping, ever-
changing pathways. As far north as St. Louis, red, pink and green zones indicate 
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formerly dominant routes – each weaves through others, billowing out like 
variegated ribbons. Each ghosted riverbed fertilizes young forests with the alluvium 
of a bygone era. The Cotton Kingdom of Louisiana and spine of sugar plantations 
along the river thrived off this rich sediment – the agricultural economy of Louisiana 
depended on it. John McPhee writes that "southern Louisiana exists in its present 
form because the Mississippi River has jumped here and there within an arc about 
two hundred miles wide, like a pianist playing with one hand – frequently and 
radically changing course" (McPhee 5). Each previous course has been settled with 
"arcuate strings of Cajun towns" – Bayou Teche, Bayou Lafourche. These are now 
fishing communities along creeks and tributaries of the main river, now cemented in 
place. In the 1940s, Fisk and a geographer named R.J. Russel identified six discrete 
lobe-shaped deltas, each with their own sub-deltas dating back only about 7,200 
years (Campanella 78). As a result, much of the land along the coast had only really 
been land for a few hundred years at the time of New Orleans' settlement. The city 
was built not on hard lithosphere, but on a "doormat" of alluvium that, without a 
replenishing supply of sediment, would just as easily subside back into the Gulf. For 
the first two hundred years of its existence, New Orleans was not defined as part of 
Louisiana state proper, but appropriately, as a coastal island.  
• • • 
 In 1851, a young anarchist fled his native France after Louis Napoléon's coup 
d'état. In the years after his escape, he served as a tutor across Europe and Central 
America. He'd trained in geography, like many of his siblings, and came to be known 
for this – his name was Elisée Reclus, now known as the father of social geography. 
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All through his travels he kept fragmentary journals and letters describing the 
ecology of various regions, and eventually arrived at the Mississippi River Delta in 
1853, via the Caribbean. His accounts are remarkably attuned to the estuary's 
ecology – he describes the delta as a "vast alluvia" composed of sands and clays from 
all the mountain ranges of America, stratified along the Louisiana coast (Reclus 33). 
All these sediments, this immense particulate migration, either filters "through the 
sea continuously in a creative process that adds islands, peninsulas, and coastline to 
the continent, or else, carried away by the Florida current, they are deposited a 
thousand leagues away on the banks of Newfoundland" (33). As his little boat 
navigated the "birdfoot delta" to drift upriver to New Orleans, his next teaching post, 
he described running ashore constantly – all throughout the channel, small alluvial 
islands had formed, to be washed away and reformed elsewhere the following day, 
with the shifting current. 
 Basil Hall, an English visitor, described a similar experience entering the 
river  twenty-three years earlier: 
 "We coasted along, past numerous small, sandy islands," he wrote, "over 
shallow banks of mud, and through several immense basins, such as Lake 
Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain, half fresh, half salt, and filled with bars, spits, 
keys and ... shoals [typical of areas] whose Deltas are silently pushing 
themselves into the sea[,] raising the bottom to the surface."    (Campanella 5) 
 
The landscape Reclus and Hall describe is porous and flexible, a delta changing 
drastically during storms, its soils shifting constantly. The same path is never 
trustworthy twice. This is the silt-heavy landscape that earned the Mississippi its 
nickname "the Big Muddy," because of the enormous pains that meant for dragging 
equipment through its sludge. Reclus' discussions of social politics and ecology are 
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surprisingly intertwined for a writing of this era. Most of the books I'll look at follow 
in Reclus' tradition of a hybrid historical study, observing the communication 
between the ecology of the landscape and the various structures that form around it 
– whether as tools of social oppression in urban space, or technologies of the river, 
with their own forms of restriction and release. 
 What follows is a survey of three major USACE structures (the Bonnet Carré 
Spillway, Morganza Floodway and Old River Control) and other methods of river 
control (levees, cutoffs and sediment diversions). Geographically speaking, it slowly 
moves from southern Louisiana to the region just north of Baton Rouge. It also 
moves generally from the earliest and most normalized forms of river control 
(levees) to the most recent and contested (modern dredge technology and sediment 
diversions). After looking at specific structures, I follow the delta to its very end, the 
southernmost tip of Louisiana in Plaquemines Parish. Scaling up all along the coast, I 
use Plaquemines to talk about land loss writ large around the Gulf coast, and the 
problematics of mapping it. Then, I scale down to talk about the politics of water in 
New Orleans. Like the USACE's mission to control the Mississippi, and subsequent 
attempts to reverse the process through coastal restoration, this project attempts to 
cover far too much in a limited amount of time with rapidly depleting resources. In 
this concession, this freedom of movement across the deltaic plain, maybe it also 
imitates a new style of river control – a semisolid, semifluid, swerving engagement 
with the landscape. 
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Chapter 2: Structures 
I. Fixing the Riverbed: the Levee Debate 
In his book on the origin of blues music in Louisiana, the ethnomusicologist Alan 
Lomax writes: 
Driving through the Delta, you hardly ever see the river, but the levee is always close 
by, a great green serpent [...] the levee is unobtrusive, since its slope is green and 
gradual, but in fact it is immense – higher and longer than the Great Wall of China, 
very likely the biggest thing that man has ever made.    (Lomax 212) 
 
The problem with levees, as Lomax would have it, is simply that they're part of a 
system too large to imagine. They exist, on a person-to-slope basis, virtually 
everywhere. If you are standing anywhere in southern Louisiana, chances are there 
is one very nearby – an inclined, grassy serpent trailing the river. But the entire 
system is unimaginably large, outlining the Mississippi and all of its tributaries, 
branching out like lung pathways through its entire watershed across the interior of 
North America. They're so common I often forgot they are anthropomorphic land 
structures, built up out of the earth and maintained since the arrival of Louisiana's 
earliest occupants. In this way, the modern levee system perfectly demonstrates the 
problem of scaling with Mississippi River infrastructure – so common that it 
becomes difficult to perceive its networked effect on attitudes toward the river, and 
its ecological consequences. 
 Today, most levees around the New Orleans area double as recreational 
parks – many have paved running and biking lanes on top. The Mississippi River 
Trail, which stretches 3,000 miles from the river's headwaters at Lake Itasca, 
Minnesota, all the way to Venice, Louisiana, runs directly through NOLA on top of a 
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levee. Despite their apparent simplicity from the ground perspective, Lomax is right 
– they're an enormous engineering feat, perhaps more important in their size and 
effectiveness than any other river control feature. They predate every other style of 
river control – earthen dikes built to prevent flooding or encourage irrigation have 
been used since the earliest known agricultural projects in the Indus Valley, 2600 
B.C.. "Levee" itself is actually a very broad term meaning "lifed" (note: past tense) in 
French. It encompasses all imaginable styles of embankments using all imaginable 
materials – piles or walls of sandbags, silt, clay, concrete, wood, tetrapods and 
geotubes – anything to lift up the existing topography and keep water out. It also 
refers to the natural levee of the Mississippi, formed of sediment deposits just 
beyond the riverbank, just beyond the batture (riverbank forest, mostly willow and 
cottonwood). Battures offer invaluable erosion control – its roots quite literally keep 
the riverbank from being eaten away by every flood. When the batture is clear-cut, 
concrete forms have to do the same work.  
 Before artificial levees, high spring water from northern snowpacks flooded 
over the batture and the natural levee, supplying the backswamp with sediment and 
nutrients that (for the rest of the year) inflated the soil. The drainage of 
groundwater from this land causes a reverse process called subsidence – the land 
literally deflates, falling below sea level and becoming even more prone when the 
levee is breached. Shortly put – levees have the potential to worsen floods, making 
them higher, more common and more violent. 
 The artificial levee is more than a grassy, oblong hill. It's a political border 
that the Mississippi must obey, by mandate of the Army Corps of Engineers – 
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without levees, the boundary between Mississippi and Louisiana would remain 
static and meaningless while the river's curvature shifted across the alluvial plain, 
and the Port of New Orleans shriveled into irrelevance. According to the USACE, 
flooding only happens when the river deviates from its leveed boundaries – the fault 
lies entirely in high spring water. Until the turn of the century, federal river policy 
didn't reflect that the levees themselves might be partially to blame – actants in an 
ecological feedback system creating gradually worsening floods. Unpopular theories 
proposed that, unable to flood over the levee, snowpack waters merely rose ever 
higher. 
 This past January, I drove out to River Ridge, LA (just a riverbend north of 
New Orleans) to the site of an 1849 breach called Sauvé's Crevasse. Crevasse means, 
according to a 1823 journalist, "the name given to a fissure or breaking of the levée 
[...] almost uniformly produced by neglect" (Campanella 1). They most commonly 
occur in four ways: overtopping (river rises above), underflow (river scours a hole 
underneath), slumping (weight of water pushes a section through) and erosion 
(waves cause the levee to slowly degrade). Crevasses in the 1800s were a fairly 
common event, but were mostly small-scale – flooding agricultural land and not 
much else. This is because levees in the New Orleans area were still maintained by 
private, riverside landowners, who were almost entirely plantation owners. And 
most of the plantations in Louisiana's cotton, sugar and indigo kingdoms, were 
maintained by slaves of West African, Caribbean and (to a much smaller degree) 
Native American descent. The construction of levees below the Mason-Dixon line is 
actually one of the largest concealed labor projects in the U.S. – the Army Corps even 
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notes in their informational database about levees that it's a common misconception 
most American levees were built and maintained by the federal government. This is 
untrue – only half the levees in Plaquemines Parish south of New Orleans, for 
instant, are federally maintained. The rest are privately owned, mostly by 
petrochemical corporations, who are then responsible for the implications for the 
whole parish if their portion of the perimeter fails. 
 On May 3, 1849, the levee at Pierre Sauvé's sugarcane plantation was cut 
through by underflow and eaten away to a 150 foot gape, letting spring water flow 
freely into present-day Elmwood, Jefferson, Hollygrove neighborhoods, then into the 
"bowl" of New Orleans city central, inundating nearly a fourth of the land that 
flooded during Katrina. Most of this land in Jefferson County was agricultural or 
undeveloped at the time, but when the floodwaters reached the city, it began 
flooding homes at a depth of about six feet. As historian Richard Campanella tracked 
in a 2014 Times-Picayune article, the flood only damaged about ten percent of the 
land it flooded, but debilitated parts of the city's streetcar line. Steamboats 
advertised tours of the breach in the local newspapers. A woman named Elizabeth 
Lamoisse famously painted Canal Street under a few feet of water, devoid of cars. 
Figures in covered canoes drift between Canal's characteristic median stand of pine 
trees, shaded from the harsh Louisiana sun. 
 Despite the relatively small amount of inhabited property flooded, the 
crevasse became New Orleans' rallying cry for the "Swampbuster Act" of 1850, 
which involved the federal government in widespread drainage of wetlands along 
the southernmost Mississippi. As Walter Johnson notes in The River of Dark Dreams, 
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during floods levees take on a double identity. Though they were built to keep water 
out, once an overtopping occurs they do the exact opposite – keep it in. Quite simply, 
he writes: "levees created swamps" though they were intended to prevent them 
(Johnson 90). With the widespread agricultural clear-cutting occurring in the lower 
Mississippi Valley, floods became less irrigable and more destructive. By preventing 
drainage, levees held breach water in, creating anthropogenic swamps and forcing 
the land's inhabitants to manually drain the water out – and with it, massive 
amounts of sedimentary topsoil, putting almost half of New Orleans' inhabited land 
below sea level, where formerly it was at or above. This, very briefly speaking, is the 
beginning of how massive land subsidence began to occur during the early 1800s 
(Campanella). The division that carried out these sophisticated drainage projects 
eventually became the Mississippi River Commission in 1879, a federal entity under 
the umbrella of the USACE. Around the time of its creation, Samuel Clemens (Mark 
Twain) was drifting down from St. Louis as a novice steamboat pilot. 
 
Fig. 3. The levee at Sauvé's Crevasse (personal photo). 
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 The levee at Sauvé's Crevasse meets today's height requirements of fifteen 
feet above city grade, part of the USACE's 2011 "Project Flood" plan. The river-facing 
side of the levee is armored with concrete revetment mattresses that protect the soil 
from severe erosion. About twenty feet below the pavement, there is a thick, T-
shaped concrete wall that prevents water from scouring the levee up from 
underneath. At thousand feet punctuations, there are pumping stations which 
gather rainwater from River Ridge neighborhood – from the highway and empty 
drainage lots – and empty it back out into the Mississippi. Some are decrepit and 
apparently out of order, like this one from the 1970s, compared to one from the 
early 2000s: 
   
Fig. 4. Pumping stations along the levee at Sauvé's Crevasse (personal photos). 
 Spraypaint on the asphault designates underground utilities, pipes flowing 
through the trapezoid of earth. They exist primarily to pump rainwater out of 
riverfront neighborhoods, where it settles at the lowest elevation, in massive pools 
that extend across parks, ditches and bioswales after heavy thunderstorms. 
Wherever outfall canals extend into the city – at 17th Street, Orleans and London 
Avenue, the levees too fold in with them. These outfall canals are where the majority 
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of storm surge water breached the Army Corps' levees during Katrina and flooded 
nearly half the city, and did so precisely because the levees were there.  
 
II. Sentry to the North: The Bonnet Carré Spillway (1930) 
 The town of Norco, LA is about 25 miles west of New Orleans, situated along 
a stretch of the Mississippi known as the "German Coast" in St. Charles Parish. It's 
called this because an influx of German immigrants were assigned this stretch of 
property in 1721. The organization that owned the land was the Company of the 
Indies, a French banking corporation which held monopoly over most of the land in 
southern Louisiana until 1731. They left a small population of Germans there as 
engagés to intermarry with Acadians and operate sugar plantations, supplying 
surplus food for New Orleans. This area is also the site of the largest slave revolt in 
American history. In 1811, Charles Deslondes, the son of a Haitian slave and white 
plantation owner, led 200 slaves of West African and Carribbean descent from 
Woodland Plantation toward New Orleans, only to be driven back to present-day 
Norco by planter militia (Bacon-Blood). The heads of forty-five executed rebels were 
displayed on poles on top of the levees at their owners' plantations (Misrach 28). 
The place-names along this stretch of river – in corrupted German, French and 
Spanish – are rich with history, violence, a land stripped of nutrients by centuries of 
monocrop agriculture, adapted into oil refineries and nuclear facilities. The name 
"Norco" is merely an acronym for the "New Orleans Refining Company." This 
company was bought out by Shell and converted into their largest refinery in the 
continental U.S.. It now employs most of the surrounding population. I don't mean to 
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pass judgement by collapsing history – all of this is just a testament to the unseen 
strata of sweat, blood, sugar and semen in this soil. 
 For our current purposes, here's the most important fact about this place: the 
two miles of land just west of Norco occupy the shortest distance between the 
Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain of anywhere in their neighboring bodies. 
This geographic condition makes it the perfect location for a river diversion, a kind 
of river control not attempted by the Army Corps of Engineers until "the last great 
flood" of the Mississippi in 1927, best documented by John Barry in Rising Tide 
(1998). This flood is widely accredited as the largest in American history, 
inundating 27,000 square miles and displacing 700,000 people as far north as 
Kentucky. Before this "call to arms" against the river's intensifying floods, the USACE 
had a policy of merely heightening levees with the spring waters. Many engineers – 
Charles Ellet included, as early as 1852 – argued that levees alone allowed 
floodwater to scour the river bottom of sediment and rise higher yet, without its 
normal capacity to drain over the natural levee into the surrounding wetlands. Much 
better, he argued, to install a system of checkpoint diversions, allowing engineers to 
tweak the river flow at various key points. During the 1927 flood, a levee just below 
New Orleans at Caernavon was dynamited, allowing a much-needed outlet for 
floodwaters and saving many city residents from further destruction. This 
emergency diversion demonstrated the effectiveness of such allowances. Ellet's 
vision became Project Design Flood, authorized by the Flood Control Act of 1928, 
and the Bonnet Carré Spillway was its first major actor. Workers broke ground in 
1929 and construction was completed in 1930.  
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 At the time, this was a revolutionary break from tradition for the Mississippi 
River Commission (the branch of the USACE responsible for its entire drainage 
basin, which encompasses most of mainland America). This policy shift represents 
more than a simple change of engineering strategies – it also means accomodating 
the river's deviance and opportunism rather than defying it, walling it off. As John 
McPhee suggests, if we attempt to see such major floods from the river's point of 
view (which of course is an exercise in futility), they're merely events of gravity and 
grade. A surplus of spring water travels according to physical laws regardless of 
political boundaries: no surprise. 1929 was the kind of event that occurred annually 
(albeit to a smaller scale) before the settlement of New Orleans – it was how the 
coastal wetlands received nutrients and sediment and were able to thrive. Thus, 
Bonnet Carré also represents an acknowledgement that the river's ecosystem 
extends beyond its banks. It enables the landscape to be a "porous place" with 
shifting, watery boundaries, to take a term from Adam Mandelman. Its floodway is 
one of the only places in southern Louisiana where the river's natural flood cycle is 
still allowed to take place.  
 The Mississippi, characterized by New York Times headlines as "the 
untameable river," "America's watery aorta," the lifeblood of the American 
heartlands, which gives but is simultaneously "monstrous" and destructive, 
becomes accomodated. This may seem like a common-sense policy change that 
formed in reaction to a series of worsening floods, but thinking about it in entirely 
military terms complicates the matter. If the Mississippi River Commission is a war 
against Divine Providence, spillways represent a concession, a compromise – 
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actually, an agreement on very uneven terms. Practically, they require the 
displacement of rural communities and the rewilding of agricultural lands, allowing 
the river to carry out its fundamental flood processes in a series of spigots. 
Metaphorically, they are military strongholds which serve as outlets for the river's 
periodical bursts of rage. 
 While two friends and I walked around the base of the structure to take 
pictures, I had the distinct feeling of trespassing on federal property. When I heard a 
voice shout down, "You need anything?" I was sure we'd screwed up. I couldn't have 
been further from the truth. The voice belonged to Mindy, a woman working the 
front desk of the Army Corps office, and she was seeing if we wanted to know 
anything about the spillway before she went to lunch at the Norco Subway. We 
ended up talking for half an hour about her eight-year-old daughter's obsession with 
Frozen paraphenalia, including a full, blonde braided wig to complete her Elsa 
costume (not for Halloween, just everyday apparel). Dr. Chris Brantley, a biologist 
and overseer of the structure, was away that day – but the office shows an 
educational video to school groups in his stead. 
 The Bonnet Carré Spillway is an example of a "frame" or "needle weir," a 
popular style of river control built by French engineers in the early 1800s. A weir is 
different from a dam – it's not intended to block the natural flow of water. It only 
obstructs the flow slightly, so a pool of water forms at its top, while water courses 
through it. Needle weirs consist of a line of short wooden slats (needles) arranged 
along a larger structure – in the case of Bonnet Carré, there are 350 concrete bays 
containing, in total, 7,000 needles. On the spillway side of the structure, there's a 
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small retention basin and about a hundred meters of concrete pilings to prevent the 
foundations from being scoured up by severe floodwaters. When annual spring 
snowmelt comes down, runoff from the Mississippi easily seeps through the bays of 
the structure into the floodway, converting it into a temporary wetland. Underneath 
the structure, thousands of wooden pilings are driven into the soil. Like the pilings 
supporting most of the historic French Quarter's foundations, they won't rot so long 
as the water table remains steadily above them – no problem in such a wet place.  
 
Fig. 5. BCS viewed from the floodway – retention basin and needles (personal photo). 
 Despite its monolithic, inert appearance, Bonnet Carré is a highly permeable 
structure, a kind of tweakable membrane between the Mississippi and Lake 
Pontchartrain. You can't see it in this photo, but on the other side of the structure 
there is a low, grassy field stretching out about 600-800 feet to the riverbank. In the 
flat, gray waters of the Mississippi, container ships line out to the horizon in both 
directions. The names vary but are mostly Asian: SHANDONG, JIN ZHU HAI. On the 
opposite bank, a cooling tower at the Louisiana Power and Light Waterford steam-
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electric generating plant spews fire into the sky, releasing pressure and heat from 
its three nuclear facilities. If you stand there on the shore hummocked with 
sediment, you can only think how incredibly removed this is from the Mississippi 
immemorial of Mark Twain, a romantic river with an unpredictable temper. A river 
has never looked so tame, so completely divorced from nature.  
 In 2013, parts of the HBO show "True Detective" were filmed here, 
capitalizing on the dismal aesthetic of the infrastructure and clear-cut expanse. In 
one scene, driving along a guide levee, Matthew McConaughey's character remarks, 
"Pipeline's covering up this coast like a jigsaw. Place is going to be underwater in 
thirty years." This knowledge seems to have become an accepted tenet of life 
outside the city floodwalls: the rate of land loss is exponentially growing, and the 
current system is unsustainable. Everyday life continues until there is another flood 
or storm, and then the consequences are reaped. 
 Bonnet Carré's shoreline, according to Project Manager Chris Brantley, was 
boat-dredged by the Army Corps until the late 1970's, to prevent a natural levee 
from building up so high as to block the floodway's opening. Now, shore 
maintenance is done with CAT hydraulic shovels and scoops. The earth is raw, fresh, 
muddy, altered. Its location is no mistake – Bonnet Carré is situated on the accreding 
bank of the Mississippi, its out-turn, so that sediment deposited on its shore 
prevents the gradual erosion of the riverbank. The in-turn bank of the Louisiana 
Power and Light plant is a solid concrete levee with dead grass along its crest. 
 What seem like small differences in water level to the American northerner 
make an incredible difference in southern Louisiana, where inches measure the 
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difference between "high water" and a flood or a breach. Water levels at the 
floodway (and most river control sites in southern Louisiana) are monitored by the 
USGS office in Baton Rouge, and data from the past year are publicly available on 
their website. You can see the monthly trends – in January 2015, the gage height 
peaked at around 9.2 feet on the 16th, and slowly decreased to its mean of 4.5 by the 
end of the month (USGS). Chris explains – adding a caveat that he's no weather 
specialist – that these monthly wet periods are caused by high pressure over the 
south Pacific, pushed north by La Niña weather events off the coast of Chile. As flood 
monitoring technologies advance almost exponentially, the USGS can predict high 
pressure like clockwork before it arrives. Chris' most important job is to take these 
data models and decide whether they deserve structural attention at Bonnet Carré. 
If there's ever a sudden need to open up the spillway, he needs to be able to make it 
happen at a moment's notice. The call actually comes from Major General Mike 
Wehr, commander-in-chief of the Mississippi Valley Division of the USACE, who 
mandates the exact amount of c.f.s. (cubic feet of water per second) to be diverted 
through the structure. For larger structures like Old River Control, 135 miles north 
in Vidalia, LA, this measurement is decided on by a full Congress – then passed 
through Wehr. 
 On ground, it only takes three people to open the spillway – one for each 
crane, and one to supervise. However, the USACE usually hires out eight specially-
trained staff members for each crane, with two supervisors each. The cranes 
inchworm along the bays, individually removing the needles to allow water through. 
He has supervised two openings thus far – 2008 and 2011 – and he says his main 
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source of stress is actually the crowd of locals drawn to watch, up to several 
thousand. It's a very public event, and people come from all over the area to see the 
flood, a peculiar spectacle of narrowly averted disaster. He appoints a few staff 
members to make sure enthusiastic fishermen don't try to launch their boats, or that 
kids playing along the guide levees don't accidentally get sluiced off to Pontchartrain 
in the riptide. 
 Despite these responsibilities, Chris is first and foremost a biologist, and is 
well aware of the ecological impact that a spillway opening can have on Lake 
Pontchartrain. Spring floods and occasional openings give the lake a sudden 
injection of Mississippi water, temporarily reverting its brackish western waters 
into freshwater. Saltwater organisms are pushed further out into the Gulf, except for 
oysters, which are sessile. They can withstand up to about a week of freshwater, but 
after that, massive oyster kills can occur. Blue crab and brown shrimp are driven 
further out into unfamiliar fishing grounds, to be replaced by blue catfish and 
largemouth bass. The fishing community is often vocally against openings for this 
reason. Algae blooms in Pontchartrain can also occur if phytoplankton populations 
get out of control. There's a whole range of trophic effects these currents can bring. 
The Army Corps dependably paints a positive picture – ideally, when the lakewater 
contains beween two and twenty parts per thousand salinity, the majority of 
freshwater and saltwater organisms can flourish simultaneously. Phytoplankton 
(supplied by freshwater) are eaten by zooplankton, which feed shrimp populations 
(supplied by saltwater). Salinity is a delicate balance along the western border of 
the lake, so measuring the amount of water that's diverted through the spillway can 
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make all the difference between a much-needed boost in biodiversity and an 
ecological wreck. 
 Chris says these gray areas – zones of intermediate brackish water in coastal 
wetlands – are greatly diminishing with land loss. He's all for diversion tactics that 
will reintroduce freshwater to areas of the coast no longer receiving it – after 
centuries of straightjacketing the river's high water with levees. I remember the 
Land-Building delta of Basil Hall, with the plain of basins, "half fresh, half salt," and 
the incredible range of phytoplankton and all the euryhaline species that can 
navigate brackish water – gars, eels, bullheads, bluegills, pickerel, catfish, carp. And, 
of course, shrimp. 
 The Bonnet Carré Spillway demonstrates a kind of openness rare to other 
Army Corps sites in southern Louisiana. It's a highly recreational area. There's easy 
visitor parking. There are no signs to warn off trespassers – in most respects, this is 
a public park. The Army Corps office is right off the road, instead of set back behind 
a barbed wire fence (like every other site I visited), and I didn't need to set up an 
appointment, I just walked in. Perhaps this is because of its proximity to New 
Orleans, the fact that it's much more likely to receive tourists interested in the 
spillway, or birders – and hunters, lots of them, who patrol the bordering forests. 
There's a a number of artificial ponds with names suggesting their community of 
visitors who have a legacy on the spillway – Wesley, Amy, Holley, Tyrone, Bob, 
Fhylway, Mr. Ed, Clark, Wacko. Much of the clay salvaged from them go to rebuild 
nearby levees. During spring floods, they fill with fish and freshwater crustaceans – 
that was Chris' childhood introduction to the spillway, coming here to net crawfish 
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with his dad. There's a section devoted entirely to the local RC model airplane club, 
and a small stretch on the western end for dog training. When I was there, a man 
fired clay pigeons from the back of his pickup, shot them, and his dog fetched the 
remains. From a bird's eye view, you can see a huge webwork of ATV tracks: this is 
also a racegrounds.  
 Bonnet Carré's openness may have to do with how the land was bought out. 
The Morganza Floodway, for instance, isn't under the federal government's eminent 
domain – its basin is patchworked with private property, extending from north of 
Baton Rouge all the way through the Atchafalaya Basin and into the Gulf. The two 
properties that existed on Bonnet Carré before its construction, the "Diamond" or 
earlier "Roseland" and "Hermitage" (both sugar plantations) were requesitioned by 
the USACE in 1928. Diamond (owned by the Kenner family) wasn't being used, but 
Hermitage was an active farm owned by the Kugler family. Much later, in the 1980s, 
it came to public attention that there are cemeteries on both properties dating back 
to their earliest settlement. These graveyards, unmarked on early maps of the 
property, each contain about 150 bodies of unidentified slaves of West African and 
Caribbean descent. During the 1975 opening of the spillway, remains of one body 
came to the surface and were taken by the St. Charles Coroner and Sheriff, who 
thought it was the body of a dumped murder victim. In 2008, the site was finally 
scoured and excavated by archaeologists – families of the descendants were 
contacted about what how the USACE should landscape the site, and in 2012 a 
meeting was finally held on the topic, led by Chris Brantley. A Kugler family 
descendant was present, as well as Leon Waters, a local historian and griot, 
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descendant of enslaved rebels involved in the 1811 march to New Orleans. Kugler 
requested that, on the historical plaque to be installed, a large version of his family 
insignia would be printed. Waters responds with a long discussion of language to be 
used on the sign – never "residents" because it obscures the slaves' role as captives, 
never "African American" instead of "African" or "of African descent" – and that the 
Kugler name not be printed, because it's no longer Kugler property (USACE 7).  
 This whole debate brings to light an effect that USACE projects sometimes 
have on large historic properties in southern Louisiana – that of dehistoricizing the 
landscape. After the spillway becomes public land pockmarked with recreational 
ponds, the story is occluded of the people who once inhabited it. A similar thing 
happens with levees in the area. People often forget that the levee system of the 
Lower Mississippi Valley, until about 1849, was built and maintained by slave labor 
on private plantations.  
 All this said, Bonnet Carré is far and away the structure with the most 
advertising available online and in print pamphlets issued by the USACE – there's 
even a hokey YouTube video called "the Spillway Story" buttressed by positive 
tokens of Louisiana culture – gumbo, jazz and scenic bayou shots. All of these convey 
the same message – the spillway is the poster child for success among a slew of 
highly contestable and constantly failing public works projects. Its technology, as a 
needle weir, is very simple and old-fashioned. It also represents the kind of flexible 
technology pushed by coastal restoration advocates, a deus ex machina escape duct 
that time and again saves New Orleans at the last minute. But this is sentimentality. 
Let's not forget that Bonnet Carré is only one cell in a very complex network of river 
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engineering, from its oldest and most banal forms (levees and dredge) to most 
recent and "innovative" (digitally self-aware sediment distribution pods, for 
instance). And, further, that this system comprises the infrastructure that has 
enabled everyday life to exist in Louisiana for the past five hundred years, with 
periods of intermittent wetness – a scale shift to be reckoned with.  
 This is the kind of "scaling-up" that I find myself constantly having to do 
when I visit flood control systems – like in Google Earth, viewing the floodway, 
when I quickly toggle out and the entire surrounding land slowly pixellates into 
resolution. It's too easy to see the Mississippi's characteristic switchbacking line 
across southern Louisiana as a static line.  
 
III. Rewilding the Delta: The Morganza Floodway 
 The presence of water nearly always complicates land ownership. River, 
lakes, estuaries, wetlands – all present fluid borders that contradict traditional 
American notions of property. A central case in point for this very simple thesis is 
the Morganza Floodway. Notice the slight word difference – Bonnet Carré is a 
spillway, but the Morganza floods. Its appearance is very similar to Bonnet Carré to 
the untrained eye, but it's fundamentally a gate, not a membrane. Instead of wooden 
needles, it's lined with thick steel doors. While the B.C.S. is a mile and a half long, 
Morganza is five, with a twenty-mile floodway. While the B.C.S. has been opened ten 
times for a total of 415 days, the Morganza has been opened only twice – in 1973 
and 2011. This is because, while its floodway only extends twenty miles, the water it 
diverts into the Lower Atchafalaya Basin drains all the way down to Morgan City 
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and out into the Gulf of Mexico. After twenty four hours, the water floods down to 
the area west of Baton Rouge. After forty eight, just north of Morgan City. Three days 
in, it floods out into the Gulf of Mexico south of Houma and into the surrounding 
coastal estuaries: geographically, its waters bell out through the entirety of southern 
Louisiana.  
 The central concern with Morganza is almost the same as with the Bonnet 
Carré, but the stakes are much higher. If the structure somehow fails, the Mississippi 
River will do what it has been attempting to do for almost a hundred years, and 
redirect down the shorter, steeper gradient to the Gulf: the Atchafalaya. It is situated 
about twenty-five miles south of the Old River Control Structure (ORCS), and directs 
its floodwaters into the same basin – only on an extremely temporary basis. In the 
way that Bonnet Carré serves as an auxiliary structure to the city of New Orleans, 
Morganza sits as a monolithic supplement to ORCS.  
 It is not, however, recreational. It is private land under a federal easement. Its 
plans were proposed in 1928 in the wake of the Great Flood (at the same time as 
Bonnet Carré), but construction began much later, in 1937. It was completed in 
1954. In the intervening years, a much vaster environmental engineering effort 
occurred than the structure itself. Its construction required that everything in a 
twenty-mile width south of it, snaking all the way to the Gulf of Mexico, 100 square 
miles in total, had to be converted to wilderness. Cheramie and Pasquier, in their 
essay on the relocation of Zion Traveler church during Morganza's construction, 
liken this to William Cronon's construction of "the American tendency to idealize 
'nature,' to separate 'us' from 'it' in order to preserve an Edenic ideal" (Cheramie 3). 
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In southern Louisiana, wherever you are, this nature-culture divide almost always 
falls along the guide levee, and nowhere is it clearer than along the borders of 
Morganza.  
 The floodway will always be a zone of instability because it is a region that 
has been repurposed by a military agency to return to a completely natural state 
whenever federally ordained. At these moments, like Bonnet Carré, it allows the 
river to complete its flood cycle unhindered – but only within the guide levees. To 
live between the levees of the Morganza, even though you are protected directly 
from the portion of the Mississippi nearest you, is always hazardous. That zone 
operates under two identities: the first is your life-as-usual, whether you're working 
at a gas station outside Morgan City or shrimping the bayou. The second is an area 
that, with a single signature, can go underwater in less than 24 hours. 
 As with other massive public works projects of a similar ilk – close to Bard, 
for instance, the Ashokan Reservoir – a massive displacement effort occured, 
spearheaded by the USACE with a billion-dollar budget. "Non-essential structures 
and spaces," mostly agricultural, were kept in the spillway, but most other 
structures were relocated just to the other side of the levee – the cemetery shared 
between Zion Traveler Baptist and Mount Olive churches (one of three) was bought 
for thirty dollars (Cheramie 5). Without disinterring the bodies, the USACE merely 
built an identical mock cemetery with empty graves on the dry side of the levee, 
after rolling the church over on logs. The graves remain empty today, and their 
bodies unaccounted for in the floodplain, which is now farming land. A large 
population of African-American farmers were displaced by this move, forced to 
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either disperse or form new communities several miles away – many of those who 
stayed still attend service at places like Zion Traveler. This is evocative of something 
discussed earlier with Bonnet Carré – the peculiar dehistoricizing effect of 
floodways on the purchased land. The USACE, in building a grid of placebo graves, 
manages to convince the community around it that they are able to keep their 
history, just move it 0.3 miles away, but what's lost during this shift? Not only 
physical bodies, but the rootedness in a particular land replaced by something so 
similar, so near, that it's almost unnoticeable. It presents the community, if they 
accept the relocation, with a new version of their own history, like a copied disc, its 
quality slightly degraded from the original. To somebody driving by, Zion Traveler 
looks as if it has always been there just to the right of that guide levee – and for the 
USACE's purposes, it has. 
    
Fig. 6. NASA and USACE photos of the Floodway in May 2011 (Wikipedia Commons, USACE). 
 
 A question that Morganza raises (by implication) is, what happens to land 
when the reverse process happens – when land is unflooded? Who do the property 
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rights go to, and under what conditions does it become federal land? This is a 
question at the heart of the present-day movement for Louisiana coastal restoration, 
a project that (as of December 31st, 2014) received $13,427,713,465 in reparations 
for the 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill.1 Their public report, online, is available in 
English, Spanish and Vietnamese. So, say somebody with gulfside property has their 
land flooded and home destroyed during Katrina. Simple: the land becomes state 
property. Richard Campanella, a geographer at Tulane, discussed this in an 
interview with me: "But what happens when water reverts to land on account of 
coastal restoration? The titleholders of a lot of these properties have to be contacted 
and involved in the fate of that footprint. Tracking them down and dealing with all 
those titles is very complicated." The population has been disenfranchised either 
because of flooding, public works projects or some massive combination of the two  
– and they're brought back to a reconnoitered land by the same token. But the land 
has been dehistoricized by the USACE, flooded or farmed – it may be 
unrecognizable, its soil quality may be completely different, rich with sediment or 
starved of nutrients in saline water.  
 The longer land sits underwater, the more it becomes a "non-place," no 
longer a grid unit in a USGS map, but a territory of water particles obeying only the 
laws of nature. It's not even a watery realm with the consistency of an ocean or lake 
– it can exist in multiple states of inundation or wetness, decided entirely by the 
                                                        
1 For reference, $11,621,821,251 of that is going to individuals and businesses for 
medical expenses and property damage. $1,472,994,209 is going to local 
governments in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas (for seafood 
testing, tourism and "behavioral health") with a smaller federal allocation. It's 
unclear how much of these compound funds will go toward projects like the Coastal 
Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA).  
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amount of water in c.f.s. that the Army Corps allows through floodgates a hundred 
miles to the north. Here you see the disconnect, the shift in geographic scale.  
 Every year, the USACE sends out letters to residents of the West Atchafalaya 
(and Atchafalaya Basin) Floodway to remind them that they may be forced to 
evacuate if there is a need to divert water – regardless, life goes on largely as usual. 
When those large-scale floods actually do occur (as in 2011), there is an enormous 
public uproar. As Campanella mimed, "they pick up their phones, call their 
congressmen and say, 'This is an outrage! The government failed New Orleans when 
the levees gave in – and can you believe it, they're flooding my land!' " The residents 
of the Morganza structure's exit path to the Gulf, as well as those inhabiting 
floodways to the north (the Madrid and the Missouri) are all living under flood 
easements. They own the land, but the federal government has the right to flood it 
when necessary.  
 Campanella argued instead for the establishment of development easements – 
which mean that the federal government, while still not owning the land of the 
floodway, still hold the right to flood it. The landowners receive additional 
compensation for not building any more structures on the land. The reasons are 
simple: people living in a floodplain, even when notified in advance, are always a 
liability. If you look at any satellite picture of Louisiana from the past twenty years, 
you will notice that a strip of land from north of Baton Rouge all the way to the 
Atchafalaya delta is green and seemingly empty. Between the guide levees there are 
173,000 acres of cypress swamp and 64,000 of aquatic land, both seasonal wetlands 
and bayous. It is not, however, empty.  
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IV. Atchafalaya Revisited: Old River Control (1963) 
 Driving north along I-10 to Baton Rouge is a prime lesson in the ecology of 
southern Louisiana. Once you exit the last band of levees and outfall canals lining 
city limits, the highway feels like a thin ribbon of concrete laid out over several 
hundred miles of swamp. The transition is almost instant. One minute, you're 
driving through the outskirts of Metairie – the next, you're in no-man's land, the 
nether-regions of Louisiana known to NOLA simply as "the bayou." It's an endless 
expanse of heavily forested swampland. In January, the trees are bare and black. The 
most striking plant is the bald cypress with its buttressed root system adaptable to 
both wet and dry situations – this is the characteristic bayou tree bearded with 
Spanish moss, by which most people unconsciously identify the Louisiana coast, in 
its southern Gothic tradition. From the air, you can see radiating lines cut into the 
swamp – bald cypresses harvested in "hub and spoke" patterns by early loggers of 
the flooded areas surrounding New Orleans (The Anxiety of Influence, Mandelman). 
There are other canals dredged without such apparent patterns, a straight, 
networked system of thruways without an apparent destination. These are usually 
oil and gas canals dredged for underwater pipelines, which slowly erode away at the 
surrounding wetlands without yearly floods and supply of sediment. After looking at 
maps of southern Louisiana for several months, this becomes an unconscious eye 
exercise: water that appears in straight lines is anthropogenic, water that wanders 
and sallies (like in the 1945 Fisk maps) is most likely "natural." 
 The biggest mistake is to assume this land is uninhabited. It is – and thickly. 
Fifteen-foot plastic skiffs motor around the base of the highway looking for shallow-
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water fish. There are fishing shacks all around, with corrugated metal siding and 
roofs, moored up to the highway pilings. It looks this way about three-fourths of the 
way to Baton Rouge, about one hundred miles in total. Only then – and the transition 
is very stark, once again – you reach the continental shelf of the United States. 
Swampland turns into great stretches of agrarian land, and I-10 is once again 
sheathed in the endless stretch of pine trees that seem to line every major southern 
thruway. Like everywhere close to the Mississippi, the towers and cooling eggs of 
the American Ruhr are never far.  
 For geological purposes, everything south of Baton Rouge is a web of young, 
coastal islands linked by a thin mat of wetlands – essentially, a thin alluvial mat 
extending out into the Gulf, no longer supplied the yearly boost of land-forming 
sediment that formed them. Without this consistency – and especially without 
frequent floods since the early 1900s – the Mississippi River is no longer the "Land-
Building Machine" (LBM) of yore. Sadly, this fact is old news. Much more recent are 
the monolithic river control structures further north that keep the old system 
pinned in place, preserving the Mississippi River circa 1963 ad infinitum. Old River 
Control is the prize jewel of this system – and it's situated well out of the public eye, 
at the turn of the Louisiana boot's border with Misssissippi. 
 In comparison to the Old River Control Structure (ORCS), Bonnet Carré can 
look somewhat cosmetic. The singular here is confusing – ORCS is actually a 
network comprised of a hydroelectric dam, two "sill structures" (essentially, river 
weirs, but much sturdier than Bonnet Carré), another dam and a boat lock dredged 
to eleven feet below sea level. Geographically and temporally this is confusing – all 
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structures, as usual, were completed at different points in time corresponding to 
different needs. What makes ORCS so special, other than its expansiveness, is the 
fact that it's one of the better-known river control sites in Louisiana other than 
Bonnet Carré – and not for recreational reasons. In February 1987, John McPhee 
published a piece in the New Yorker called "Atchafalaya" about the importance of 
ORCS in preventing the Mississippi from redirecting entirely down the more 
convenient pathway – namely, the Atchafalaya River. Two years later, the essay was 
republished in a collection called The Control of Nature – in both publications, the 
essay was widely read and garnered the Army Corps of Engineers an unwarranted 
amount of attention. It thoroughly illuminated the futility of the task at hand, and 
the militaristic language used to describe it. Always, the Army Corps describes a 
"war" against the river, which must remain straightjacketed within levees for the 
safety of the surrounding population. 
 Old River Control is well off the beaten path. Driving there, my GPS directed 
me along a levee-side road that traverses some of the poorest land in Louisiana. As 
of 2013, almost thirty percent of Concordia Parish lived under the poverty line (ten 
percent below state average), about sixty percent white and thirty percent black (US 
Census). For about another hour past Baton Rouge, I sped past tarpapered 
structures set up on concrete blocks and motor homes strewn with tinsel and 
Christmas decorations. According to the census, the majority of the local population 
works in retail and "office jobs," with only about ten percent farming. Not being a 
social statistician by any means, I wonder what significance a structure like ORCS 
has on the local economy. In terms of its landscape presence, it's easy to miss. The 
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lower sill structure, Sidney Murray Hydroelectric Station, and auxiliary (or 
"closure") structure all double as roadways – all except the last are fairly 
inconspicuous. But the auxiliary structure is a series of seven enormous concrete 
bays connected by walkways and stairwells, whose purpose still somewhat eluded 
me during my site visit. It's situated much higher above grade to provide additional 
release should it ever need to release flood waters back through the Mississippi. 
From the structure extend two curved conrete walls to prevent shore erosion in the 
unlikely event that the mammoth structure actually be dug up like a levee. Given the 
sheer size of the structure, the fact that such an event is possible stumps me. The 
shores on the southern side of the structure were parched, dry to the point of 
cracking. Because of this, you can tell it's composed mostly of clay – the lower outlet 
of Old River hasn't received smaller sedimentary particles since 1963. 
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Fig. 7. Lower Auxiliary Structure at Old River (personal photo), ORCS via USACE Flickr and GoogleEarth. 
 
 Despite the Auxiliary Structure's impressiveness, the main component of the 
ORCS network is the sill structure a few thousand feet to the north. This is where 
McPhee's attention is directed in the 1987 essay. It has ten bays with metal gates 
that restrict the water input into the Atchafalaya River, like the Bonnet Carré or 
Morganza. There is little difference in structural design, really – except for the fact 
that the ORCS sill mediates the flow of an active waterway. Not only that, it's not just 
battling the Mississippi's floodwaters. It's battling the gravity of the entire 
Mississippi river (floods included) – which tells it without a doubt to redirect down 
the Atchafalaya, the easier path to the Gulf. I say this with some drama, but all of it 
warranted: the fate and livelihood of all Louisiana residents living below the ORCS 
depends entirely on its functionality, every day of the year. 
 For this reason, the ORCS network represents a profoundly different war 
than the floodways that preceded it. From the standpoint of flood policy alone, it 
would be enormously convenient for the Mississippi to redirect down the 
Atchafalaya. In this scenario, the former path of the Mississippi would gradually 
become a bayou a third of the original channel's size, not subject to occasionally 
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violent spring waters. But with the floods, everything else would dwindle – the 
river's utility as a major trade route into the heartlands of the U.S., encompassing 
over 39 states with their major cities. The petrochemical industries thriving off of 
this accessibility would likewise fall, their massive plants rendered useless. The port 
and city of New Orleans would eventually be bankrupted, and its industries would 
shift to more convenient locations like Morgan City, Houma or Lafayette. This is the 
worst-case scenario. From a land conservation standpoint, it would also be 
complicated – the birdfoot delta, no longer receiving its yearly load of sediment, 
would fade away (like it's already doing), but the Atchafalaya delta would flourish. A 
new deltaic lobe would begin formation, and the LBM would be, Army Corps 
notwithstanding, back in business – fifty miles west of New Orleans. 
 The banks of the river here are heavily manufactured, lined with concrete 
revetments and supported by stone jetties like those built along Lake Pontchartrain. 
More than any other river control site, ORCS made the Mississippi look like an 
industrial channel carved into the land, a thruway for massive trade boats. 
Geographically, its evolution is somewhat complicated. Around the time Abraham 
Lincoln came down the river on a flatboat in 1828, the junction between the 
Mississippi and the Atchafalaya (via the Red River) was completely blocked by a 
natural logjam. Thousands of fell trees that had fallen into the river from erosion 
and flooding gradually built up in a pile at the rivers' confluence and were cemented 
together with sediment, effectively acting as a weir that only allowed in a fourth of 
the actual current. In 1831, Captain Henry Shreve of the Union Army dug a channel 
through Turnbull's Bend, the oxbow that joined the two rivers. This channel filled 
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with water – except for a thin earthen wall that contained explosives. When it was 
dynamited, the Mississippi quickly redirected down the faster route, reopening the 
entrance to the Atchafalaya. Such minor alterations – a small channel dug a few 
hundred feet between two river bends – demonstrate the complete opportunism 
that the river became known for in that time. At its size and velocity, it will take any 
open route that offers the path of least resistance to lower ground, and eventually 
the Gulf. At the present moment, it has been mandated against the better route. 
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Chapter 3: Scaling Up 
Venice, Louisiana 
Travel (something the ethnologist mistrusts to the point of hatred)  
constructs a fictional relationship between gaze and landscape.  
Marc Augé, "Non-Places" (86). 
 
 During my month in Louisiana, I followed a simple itinerary. In the morning, I 
drove out of New Orleans (Marigny neighborhood) to various river control sites 
throughout southern Louisiana. I talked to USACE officials, geographers, landscape 
architects, or whomever I ran into while crawling over concrete structures and 
taking pictures. In the afternoon, I went to libraries, wrote and read. At night, I ate as 
much crawfish étouffée as possible. In no way does this constitute ethnography. 
Maybe it more resembles the travelogue genre, in which the intrepid writer 
researches a place, arrives with a list of preconceptions, and piece by piece attempts 
to verify each one. Or Twain's model, where the intrepid writer arrives with no 
ideas and no plans – just a rucksack – ready to be filled with firsthand impressions 
of the landscape and "genuine," local interactions. I say this tongue-in-cheek, with 
some amount of distrust. If I'm concerned with categories, maybe I would classify 
this month simply as a time to satisfy my obsessions, and ask people on the ground: 
how exactly is life sustainable here? What kind of system can be designed – so late – 
to repair a complex of river control technologies that have literally become the 
ecology of the region, the one governing factor controlling where water is allowed 
and where it's not? 
 Admittedly, I read a fair amount of ethnography and I find it very useful to 
read river infrastructure through an anthropological lens – one which networks the 
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system of actors, human and nonhuman, that plume out from these structures all 
through the Mississippi River delta, literally flooding the banks. I won't pretend to 
take the same approach. I had too many moments of outright failure, incomplete 
trips, or intuitive drives out to obscure locations to identify my experience as 
ethnographic. My conversations were exactly that – conversations, not interviews. 
My excursions felt more like scouting for a larger, unrealizable project, one that 
could examine on a closer scale all the displacement, unrest and coastal instability 
caused by Louisiana's infrastructure.  For instance, one Saturday after breakfast, a 
friend and I decided to get in the car and drive as far south as possible.  
• • • 
 It's not difficult to get to the southernmost tip of Louisiana. The directions 
are basic: from New Orleans, cross the Crescent City Connection, make a right-hand 
turn onto Louisiana 23-S, and drive to the end of civilization. In whole, it takes about 
two hours. You may feel the surrounding landscape collapsing into a horizontal blur 
of infrastructure, petrochemical industry and housing units – never allow yourself 
the luxury of ignoring the blur. Plaquemines Parish, which you enter almost 
immediately upon exiting the floodgates of New Orleans, is a place in which most 
central questions of river control are posed at their most extreme. I mean 
"floodgates" very literally – at the southern city limit, there is a point where a levee 
meets the highway. On either side of the road, long metal gates flank the length of 
the road, which can be closed during high water events, effectively sealing the flood 
out – but also the entire population of Plaquemines. 23 is their only artery to the 
north. Admittedly, the gates aren't obtrusive and are easy to miss as you drive by, 
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but they send a very clear message – if you live south of this line, God help you when 
the next storm comes. 
 Infrastructure, however, continues. South of Chalmette, the earthen levees 
along 23 were under extensive construction when I drove down in January 2015. 
Small clusters of cranes and CAT crawlers distributed and packed mounds of soil 
into a compact trapezoidal shape, reinforced with buried concrete T-walls to 
prevent erosion. This work is done by the Coastal Protection and Restoration 
Authority (CPRA), a division of the USACE established soon after Katrina to mitigate 
wetland loss. As soon as you exit the floodgates, citrus groves begin. They're 
everywhere – planted in cemeteries, backlots and trailer parks, alone in a stretch of 
swampland or a hundred meters from an enormous processing plant, separated 
only by a chain-link fence and a hundred meters of soil. Little orange stands litter 
the roadside. A pile of children's bicycles accumulate in a front yard. 
 There are quonset huts, sallow fields, men riding tractors down the center of 
the highway, endless trailers set up on concrete blocks – maybe temporary homes 
provided by FEMA that were never upgraded, or whose occupants moved out. There 
are always smokestacks in the distance. By these towers, you can always measure 
your distance from the Mississippi – plants and facilities for Monsanto, Halliburton, 
Chevron, OMI, TARGA, and endless other big names in petrochem trace the river's 
every switchback. This has earned the stretch of river between New Orleans and 
Baton Rouge various unflattering nicknames – Cancer Alley is the one Kate Orff and 
Richard Misrach use in their book "Petrochemical America," which traces the history 
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and impact that chemical breaches, displacement, and oil buyouts have had on 
surrounding communities' health and living quality.  
 Another transition is also clear: human settlement spreads ever thinner the 
further south you go, and when it does appear, it appears on increasingly higher 
pilings. Even the cross in front of a Presbyterian church is elevated on a small 
platform – and I think, "come Hell or high water." I imagine this clause must figure 
literally or figuratively in many of the land contracts and leases in Plaquemines 
Parish – who would make such an investment, other than oil workers and 
fishermen? On 23-S you pass two enormous public schools, both of them raised a 
full two floors on massive columns, with double staircases leading to the entrance. 
They look, unsurprisingly, like fortresses with their hexagonal wings and tightly-
sealed windows, echoing the militaristic lingo of the USACE. I wonder, what level of 
flooding legitimizes a day off? Is it something they deal with yearly, or entirely 
provisional, only becoming necessary when hurricanes breach the surrounding 
levee? I would have asked somebody, but on a hot January Saturday, both schools 
were empty. 
 The further south you go, the more harbors and shrimp boats there are. The 
raised nets of shrimp trawlers are the only other prominent vertical element in the 
landscape besides cranes. You can tell there is a large Vietnamese population here 
by the names carefully painted on the back of each boat – Thuy Trang, the Lady 
Hana. The width of the land on either the side of the highway is barely half a mile in 
total. In every direction the Gulf yawns out, docile and flat. This is the region that 
appears on colonial maps from the 1800s as the "birdfoot delta" – a projection of 
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three waterways from the central path of the Mississippi, a region that we can 
remember was described by Basil Hall and Elisée Reclus as a thickly shifting field of 
sediment and soil hummocks, coastal barrier islands that were never the same day 
to day. Now it's open water, with an increasingly vulnerable community at its 
border. 
 During a lecture for his geography class at Tulane, Richard Campanella 
reminded us that the birdfoot delta is the only area of southern Louisiana where the 
Mississippi River still functions in its pre-colonial land-building mission. 
Unfortunately, so much sediment has been trapped in various wetlands and 
diversions before it reaches Venice that even this last frontier has become impotent. 
Venice itself – the last township at the end of 23-S – isn't so much a municipality as 
it is a small network of marinas and anonymous, gray-brick, fenced-off facilities for 
Chevron, Halliburton and OMI Environmental Solutions (a company offering oil spill 
and hazmat response). This is also the site of the Delta National Wildlife Refuge, a 
swatch of wetlands of about 49,000 acres extending out through Terrebonne Parish. 
It encompasses almost all of the previous deltaic lobes of the Mississippi – from the 
Atchafalaya through Bayou Sauvage, Bayou Teche, Bogue Chitton, etc. The office and 
center of this coastal empire is situated at the branching off of Grand Pass Bayou 
from the Mississippi called "The Jump," and I have to admit it was a little 
disappointing. It consists of a tiny information booth, a patch of grass, and a bench 
facing the marsh. At the booth, there are single-fold hunting information pamphlets 
– in order to become a certified hunter, all you have to do is sign the bottom of one 
and bring it with you on your outrigger as you speed along. 
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 My friend Ginny and I sat there for a while watching fishermen motor by in 
shoddy boats, talking about the odd feelings this place gave us. First, there was a 
profound feeling that we were trespassing, stopping by various petrochem plants to 
take pictures of dirt mounds flocked with pelicans. At the same time, there was a 
feeling of lawlessness – that you could pull off the highway and fish wherever you 
wanted, put your boat in, hunt unperturbed. What exactly does federal oversight 
look like in such a complex web of oil canals? Venice is a peculiar mix of the 
corporate, of unimaginably large entities with their high-security plants, and local 
fishing culture, Cajuns at the very end of land. On online employment boards for the 
Venice-Boothville area, most open positions are at the TARGA plant, offshore 
platforms, and the local Dollar General. The population is 212. A Vietnam veteran 
who lives down the street from me in Savannah comes here for a few months each 
summer to work on BP oil rigs, and lives off that salary for the rest of the year – it 
makes me wonder how long each of those 212 citizens have been here. Before 
Katrina? Here on short-term contracts, just a summer and then gone?  
 For such a prominent place in the Louisiana imagination, Venice is 
surprisingly data-poor. Beyond 2005 images of fishing boats and houses stranded in 
the middle of the highway, there is not much information available about the 
birdfoot region online. There is, however, a huge community of birders who travel 
regularly down here to see coastal birds in unbelievably large numbers. As we drove 
along the last stretch of highway, twenty or so pelicans drifted over the water 
alongside us, finally flaring their wings to land, feet out. A husband-wife couple 
crouched on the shoulder of the road, watching through enormous binoculars. 
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 23-S, at its very end, meets Tide Water Road, which takes you out to what is 
technically the southernmost tip of Louisiana. It ends in the parking lot to a Chevron 
refinery, with a small unpaved trail leading out into the reeds. There is a sign: "The 
Gateway to the Gulf." 
 
Fig. 8. The southernmost tip of Louisiana (personal photo). 
 
 About eight miles below this point, the Head of Passes directs all traffic in 
and out of the main channel of the Mississippi. From 1852 to 1872, there was a 
small lighthouse situated at the center of the "birdfoot" operated by the U.S. Coast 
Guard. In 1854, its 67-foot tower was moved to Pass à l'Outre, and the Coast Guard 
lit a Fresnel lens in the single dormer window. It was destroyed by a storm. Now 
there is an unmanned, 27-foot reflective platform. This changing of hands makes me 
wonder about the history of navigation in the birdfoot. At the Historic New Orleans 
Collection in the French Quarter, I focused a magnifying glass on the three-branched 
waterway on a map dating from 1794, by a cartographer named John Ross (during 
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the Spanish rule of New Orleans).2 At the birdfoot, there were two small inkblots, 
"Tree 1" and "Tree 2." The surrounding deltaic region and web of sedimentary 
banks is labeled as "low and marshy meadows" with "shallow water covered with 
small islands, which are but very little known" (HNOC). The significance of the 
birdfoot in the late 1700s and 1800s – this unusually geometric waterway – was 
that it was a recognizable entrance to the Mississippi amid a vast plain of changing 
waterways and landforms. This must have been extremely confusing to an 18th-
century trade ship headed for the port at New Orleans. Even when you reach it, Ross 
places two lone trees for you to triangulate your position and make sure you've 
reached the actual birdfoot. But gradually, as the network of sedimentary islands 
around it subsided and dissipated into the Gulf, even the need for a lighthouse 
dwindled. It is the Mississippi's last alluvial arm reaching out into open ocean. This 
simple fact obscures what seems, to me, an extraordinary sadness.  
 I'll allow myself a brief lapse into environmental romanticism: once upon a 
time, the entrance to the Mississippi River was labyrinthine, a guessing-game in a 
plain of "the youngest land in the world," the Land-Building Machine at all engines 
go, a sand motor at full throttle (Jacobs). It was marked by two trees in an expanse 
of muddy jetties, and a small, intermittently manned lighthouse. Now, the entrance 
to the Mississippi is singular. The plain is gone, and the river's path circa 1930 
extends out into the Gulf, preserved in perpetuity. But even it is eroding – and 
quickly. In "Bayou Farewell" by Mike Tidwell, the author is on a shrimping trawl 
near Grand Isle, LA, watching the GPS, when suddenly he notices they are about to 
                                                        
2 Course of the River Mississippi from the Balise to Fort Chartes (1794). By John Ross, 
pub. Laurie & Whittle (1982). Property of the Historic New Orleans Collection. 
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collide with a sand jetty at full speed. He tries to catch the attention of the man 
driving the boat, Knuckles, but can't – and then they motor on through the landform. 
Knuckles says, "I bought dat computer map in 1993 [...] we used to haf to zig and zag 
t'rough canals and bayous here, now it's a straight shot. [...] De whole time, de GPS 
says we're going t'rough land" (Tidwell 179). In seven years (seven life cycles of 
brown shrimp, Tidwell notes), the obstacles are all gone. The mud lumps of Reclus 
and Hall eroded to the sparse jetties navigated by Knuckles, to the open water 
experienced by Tidwell. Today, if you enter the birdfoot delta from the Pass à 
L'Outre (from the west), you see massive turbidity curtains before any sign of land. 
 South of the birdfoot, pluming out all along the coast of Louisiana, there is 
now a famously large dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico. This hypoxic region is 
inhospitable to most marine life, and measures between 7,286 and 8,561 square 
miles in area – the size of a squashed New Jersey. It is caused largely by the chemical 
runoff from the "American Ruhr," the snake of petrochemical development along the 
Mississippi, who are notorious for their spillage incidents – but also by fertilizer 
runoff from farms.  
 These stories litter Louisiana newspapers only a little less than they pollute 
the river itself. In January, the massive Evangeline Pipeline finally burst in Cameron 
Parish. It had been leaking since October, but not repaired. In February, an oil barge 
spilled 31,500 gallons of light crude oil into the river after crashing into a towboat 
between NOLA and Baton Rouge (Merchant). In early March, BP claimed to have 
reached the "baseline condition" of cleanup after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill, an explosion that pumped 210 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, 
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largely accepted as one of the largest environmental disasters in American history 
(Marshall). The day after this statement was released, the U.S. Coast Guard released 
a statement that it was supervising the ongoing removal of a 25,000 pound oil tar 
mat from East Grand Terre Island, off Louisiana's southeast coast. Two adult 
bottlenose dolphins washed up dead the following day. Meanwhile, at a munitions 
camp in Minden, LA, a private contractor named Explo Systems abandoned a 
demolition site containing over 18 million tons of M6 propellant sold to them by the 
U.S. Army in 2012 (Robertson). Since then, they have exploded small portions of this 
stock irregularly, in the middle of the night. A committee of local ranchers and 
environmental activists has only recently rallied up with the EPA to address 
pollution concerns. In 2010, the USGS measured that 12.7 million pounds of toxic 
chemicals were dumped into the river (Callais). In 2012, they released another 
report that 57% of agricultural streams and 83% of urban streams were unsuitable 
for aquatic health (Mueller).  
 This horrifying laundry list of transgressions, both recognized and 
committed covertly on a daily basis, warrants a whole project of its own. Algae 
blooms caused by all these excess nitrates released into the river are only one facet 
of the environmental disaster flowing out of the birdfoot, and washing back on its 
shores. Pollution, quite literally, circulates in every direction. Before I began this 
project, the kind of dire attitudes I encountered in articles about land loss and 
pollution seemed to be overly dramatic – now they seem like understatement. 
 In a series of articles titled "Losing Ground" by ProPublica and the Lens, 
there is an interactive map online where readers can toggle between the birdfoot at 
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Venice from the 1930 to 2014. Between 1932 and 1956, a little corrosion occurs – 
blue creeping slowly into the green that is assumed to be wetlands. In the mid-70s, 
the blue multiplies exponentially. A thin webwork of land spreads out over place-
names that have disappeared with their corresponding land masses: Pass de Wharf, 
Bayou Tony, Yellow Cotton Bay, Wagon Wheel (this last one no doubt after early 
logging patterns). Toggling out, this process replicates all along the coast – in 
devastatingly clear graphics, you can trace the disappearing green as it is slowly 
eaten at by the blue. The border between the two is made out to be a much clearer 
line than it is in actuality.  
 On the ground, the difference is much less clear. As Adam Mandelman argues 
in "Wetlands as Borderlands," one of the reasons land loss is such a difficult issue to 
measure is that it always occurs as a "gradient between dry land and open water" 
that is often not entirely clear, existing as both "boundary and intersection" 
(Mandelman). In digital mapping terms, these areas are dealt with by using rasters – 
contiguous data sets that shift gradually over a dynamic field. They may be 
temporal, existing for only a season or depending on an unreliable water source. As 
Mandelman would have it, their identity as such an uncertain borderland, or liminal 
or hybrid space, shrouds them in a kind of doubt.  
 Rasters and borderlands suggest a kind of geographic liminality – a wet 
surface that hides shifting, underwater values ranging in sediment, water, pollutants 
and dry soil. It is a geologic hybrid difficult to express in aerial maps, even with their 
extraordinary ability to scale in and out with LandSat imagery. These wetlands 
depend on the oblique view, a wandering through the swamp, a gritty materiality to 
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be felt in the hand and tasted in the mouth, full of sense-perceptions inexpressible 
by digital mapping. They depend on a quality of light to determine their turbidity, 
the amount of particulate matter, only really perceptible by a blinking, oblique gaze 
as you wander through the shallow water, your boots stuck in the mud, sweat 
beading along the brim of your baseball cap. This, to me, is how land loss feels. Or, as 
Tidwell describes – a shrimper in Terrebonne Parish notices one day that his family 
cemetery has been almost completely inundated with water. All cemeteries are 
above grade in southern Louisiana, so that bodies don't rot in the water table or in 
the event of a flood – wherever you go, there are roadside grids of white stone 
mausoleums. 
 In order to be convincingly displayed in USGS graphics, land loss has to be 
displayed in binary terms: land versus water, illustrated by false-color maps in only 
blue and green. Blue corrosion has become symptomatic of nearly all land loss 
maps. Or, more dramatically, the Louisiana raster is cast in monochrome black and 
white, with the eroded wetlands coded in red. Both gradients train the eye to notice 
negative space rather than positive – if you look closely, on the western coast of 
Louisiana the Atchafalaya River and Wax Lake Outlet continue to build new land, 
with new rivulets and streams slowly emerging from the river mouth. Brett 
Anderson, in a cartographic study for Medium, uses a devastating visual argument – 
Louisiana has nearly lost its characteristic boot shape, as its outline swiftly hems in 
from the south. The political boundary, if it were shifted to an accurate depiction of  
current dry land, would more resemble a column, eaten away at the base. 
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 In other places, land loss is much clearer: Isle de Jean-Charles became a 
poster child for coastal erosion upon the release of the blockbuster hit "Beasts of the 
Southern Wild" (2012), which renamed it the "Bathtub" and featured many 
dramatic shots of its only access highway, stretching exposed through an expanse of 
open water with its one line of telephone poles. The road has two lanes, and one has 
almost entirely eroded into the Gulf – waves steadily lap across its pavement as 
another storm buffers in. This place has even less security than Venice: no levees, no 
governmental funding, only the prospect of heightening the pilings beneath your 
home or moving away if you can't afford it. A nine-year-old actress named 
Quvenzhané Wallis narrates: "Daddy says, up above the levee, on the dry side, 
they're afraid of the water like a bunch of babies. They think we're all gonna drown 
down here. The ground is gonna sink and the water is gonna rise up so high, and 
everything south of the levee is going under." In the film, the Bathtub's community 
rallies up and builds shelters on boats, hatching plans to dynamite the levee.  
 A more recent documentary, "Can't Stop the Water" (2014) shows the actual 
Army Corps plans that have resulted in the fictional Bathtub's sinking. In 1998, the 
USACE drafted a new levee guide plan that included Isle de Jean-Charles and its 
causeway. Swiftly afterward, the plan was revised to leave the island out. Since then, 
the width of the island has eroded from about five miles to a fourth of a mile, about 
2,000 square miles of dry land gone. Chief Albert, a member of the Biloxi-Choctaw-
Chitimacha community that has been on the island since the 1840s, drives his boat 
around the island's perimeter and points out to the camera a series of recently built 
oil rigs and the canals dredged for their pipelines, remarking that the island's 
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inhabitant have gotten monthly royalties after their construction – about thirty 
dollars each. All of these compound effects, against an ocean rising from climate 
change and subject to more frequent and violent storms, gives the residents a tone 
of sad acceptance in their speech. What if the levees were built now? So much has 
been lost already, so many people gone. 
 Even the methods of coastal restoration worked on by the USACE are under 
intense scrutiny. Here is where the scaling out occurs. By dint of the Coastal 
Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) enacted in 1990, 
there is now a Federal Task League working on about 110 coastal restoration 
projects including marsh creation, sediment diversions, the construction of oyster 
barrier reefs and levee reconstructions. This act was vetoed by George Bush, but 
was repassed by the 110th Congress in 2007 with a budget of $1.6 billion, each of 
fifteen target projects costing up to $280 million (Marshall). All are technically 
slated for completion in 2032, but with an increasingly dwindling budget, many 
have been stalled in the meanwhile.  
 The redrawing of the levee around L'Isle de Jean-Charles is just one example 
of this effect, which has had consequences for the landscape all across the coast, 
from Louisiana into Texas. Eleven of the federally-funded projects have been re-
estimated at about 500 million over budget each. Much of this project's stimulus 
package came out of BP following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. John Barry, the 
author of "Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927" recently helmed 
another lawsuit against 93 oil and gas companies (including Exxon, BP, Mobil and 
Chevron), suing them for wetland damaging caused by the construction of wells and 
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dredging of canals. The New York Times Magazine ran a cover story on it in October 
2014 with the words "Every hour, an acre of Louisiana sinks into the sea. Who is to 
blame?" placed over an image of a canal bisecting the remnants of a swamp in 
Plaquemines (Rich). 
 In February 2015, board members appointed by Governor Bobby Jindal shot 
down the lasuit with the help of Judge Nannette Jolivette. The defense stated that 
the plaintiff's charges of nuisance, negligence and drain (among others)3did not 
represent violations of the Clean Water Act, the Rivers and Harbors Act or the 
Coastal Zone Management Act because these were not designed to defend coastal 
communities against erosion, storm surge, or "indirect economic losses" (Brown 
10). Namely, that the Levee Authority didn't have the data to prove a direct 
connection between the oil companies' activities and land loss (despite the USGS' 
many studies) – and even if they did, their complaint cited unrelated environmental 
protection acts. The Deepwater Horizon fell in direct penalty for the oil spill for 
pollution rather than erosion as a result of something done in the past (dredging) – 
this is what they mean by a failure to establish an "indirect" connection. The 
CWPPRA website paints a positive picture of restoration, but on the ground, most 
investigative journalism describes the efforts as paltry, poorly funded and badly 
researched.  
 The construction of barrier islands is near unanimously accepted as a 
beneficial force – it both keeps sediment in the marshes and protects the coast from 
                                                        
3 Other than the construction of oil and gas wells, for: "road dumps, ring levees, 
drilling activities, fluid withdrawal, seismic surveys, marsh buggies, spoil disposal / 
dispersal, watercraft navigation, impoundments, and propwashing / maintenance 
dredging" (Brown 3). 
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storm surge (and therefore, erosion). River diversions, however, have proved to be 
hotly contentious for a wide range of reasons. Environmental advocates who 
fiercely support coastal restoration have turned against diversions, claiming that 
although they provide the wetlands much-needed sediment blocked by the levee 
system, they will simultaneously introduce the Mississippi's pollutants. This has 
potentially devastating effects for the bayou's biodiversity, especially for declining 
crawfish and brown shrimp populations. If the Bonnet Carré Spillway goes under 
great ecological scrutiny for its infrequent injections of freshwater into Lake 
Pontchartrain every ten years or so, diversions make the same impact – except daily. 
They push back salinity regimes, potentially displacing historic fishing grounds, 
which means bad business for small-scale fishermen up against larger companies 
for a living.   
 Some geologists, including Chris McLindon (of Stone Energy Corporation, an 
offshore drilling investor) have argued that diversion projects have done more harm 
than good. McLindon says that these freshwater introductions, laden with 
agricultural nitrates and pollution, weaken the roots of coastal marsh grasses by 
overexposing them to nutrients, quickening the erosive process when hurricanes 
pass through – namely in the Caernarvon diversion in Plaquemines Parish, not far 
from Venice (Alexander-Bloch 1). He argues instead for the prevalent use of pipeline 
dredging. Here, imagine dredge boats siphoning settled material from the bottom of 
a bay and pumping it through an articulated pipeline that sits precariously on 
concrete blocks in open water. On the other end of the bay, it spews this sediment 
onto a jetty. Hour by hour, a barrier island slowly rises from the ocean. This is one of 
76 
 
many techniques currently used by the Army Corps. McLindon's opinions have been 
swiftly denied by other scientists, who argue that diverting the Mississippi's 
sedimentary loads is the only way to majorly impact wetlands increasingly lost to 
the Gulf, and that the nitrate levels are safe. As fast as we can build islands around 
the wetlands for protection, the wetlands themselves disappear. The conversation is 
ongoing, but land loss continues worsening, especially in the late summer when 
hurricane season comes around. 
 The Caernarvon diversion is one of many that have been in place for decades. 
It was constructed in 1991, but is inconspicuous – simply a concrete culvert under 
23-S (the road to Venice) which connects the main stream of the Mississippi to the 
surrounding wetlands of Plaquemines Parish, less than half a mile away. There is a 
much more conspicuous diversion in western Louisiana that receives much less 
attention. It was built in 1941, is almost fourteen miles long, and is called the Wax 
Lake Outlet, connecting the Atchafalaya River directly to the Gulf of Mexico. 
Primarily designed to alleviate flooding in Morgan City, LA (which has become even 
more important with the building of the Morganza Floodway), it has had enormous 
unintended consequences. This is because, through the Atchafalaya, it is receiving 
an inordinate amount of sediment. And like the Atchafalaya, a deltaic plain has been 
forming at its mouth for about fifty years.  
 Its presence is striking when you know it's there, but easy to pass over in 
maps pinpointing land loss – way over there, on the western end of the state, two 
separate LBM's (Land Building Machines) have been churning away, accumulating 
sediment and wetlands in a veined lobe protruding from the coast. The Atchafalaya 
77 
 
and its unlikely sister channel, made by the same dredging process that drained the 
backswamps of New Orleans.  
 Geographer and urban historian at Tulane University Richard Campanella  
(who spoke earlier about Sauvé's Crevasse) has become somewhat of a well-known 
public figure in New Orleans over the past decade. His books on Lincoln's steamboat 
journey down the Mississippi and early colonial tales of New Orleans' settlement (in 
addition to his monthly writings in the Times-Picayune) have made him something 
of a recognizable city pundit. In January, he invited me to attend the opening 
meetings of a geography seminar at Tulane's architecture school, and I interviewed 
him the following day. He has a positive opinion of diversions, but most recently has 
been publishing and advocating the idea of utilizing dredge material from the 
deepening of the Mississippi in wetland renewal. In "Beneficial Use: Balancing 
America's (Sediment) Budget," he presents this fairly simple proposal. With the 
widening of the Panama Canal and the necessity to dig the Mississippi channel 
deeper for so-called Panamax container ships, why not steer that sediment toward 
diversions and siphons rather than tossing it in the water column to be washed 
away by the Gulf.  
 A landscape architect named Bradley Cantrell has also recently put forward 
designs with the landscape architecture program at LSU. With his class, he designed 
several models of "cyborg" technologies that distribute upstream sediment down 
through the delta – specifically, the Atchafalaya, one of the most productive areas of 
the coast. One proposal is called "PodMod." In mesh tubes attached to river control 
structures, sediment accumulates rather than hitting the weir and accumulating 
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(later to be routinely dredged out by the USACE). Instead, these tubes would fill 
smart, balloon-like "pods" with the substance, programmed to release when full, 
float down the river and trigger a "process of electrochemical corrosion" when it 
reaches a target area (Strickland). Then, each pod deposits its separate sedimentary 
load so that a "choreography" of sediment could be programmed into the full 
system, reflecting the changing needs of the delta, able to respond to real-time data 
on land change. This represents what Cantrall terms a "tunable infrastructure" – a 
technology with the adaptability of the ecosystem itself, a kind of decidedly less 
anthropocentric river control. It's also a comically grandiose idea considering the 
way the Army Corps currently spends money, with barely enough to properly 
maintain its perimeter levees.  
 Campanella and Cantrell's ideas represent two very different thought 
experiments about how river control should be modified – one intensely practical, 
with an eye always on the budget, and one an architectural imaginary that pokes at 
what it perceives as the realer, larger problem behind land loss. That problem is the 
arrogance of engineering nature, an attempt to reign supreme over the landscape at 
any cost. Here I remember the dictum inscribed on the U of Wyoming's engineering 
building: "STRIVE ON, THE CONTROL OF NATURE IS WON, NOT GIVEN," or chalked 
into the slate of ORCS: "Do What's Right, and Be Prepared to Fight as Infantry When 
Required!!!" (McPhee 13, 21). This militaristic language permeates all of the 
USACE's projects, understandably – they are a military engineering branch of the 
federal government. Cantralls' unrealizable technologies are, in a way, impossible 
attempts to win back the delta's favor, working in tandem with the stream to imitate 
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its earlier land-building process. They reject a military engagement with the deltaic 
ecology, staging accomodation rather than strict control at all costs. Campanella 
might critique this as mere environmental romanticism, attempting to turn back the 
geological clock to a time before the first human footprint in Louisiana mud, or the 
first concrete berm laid across the water.  
 
Conclusion: Scaling Down 
 There is only one thing that I left Louisiana certain of in February: attempting 
to reverse river control is an exercise in futility, and there is no environmentally 
sound solution. These levees, revetments and cutoffs, spillways and diversions, are 
largely necessary to keep the urban populations of Southern Louisiana from 
Katrina-level flooding. But even the Army Corps' revised perimeter system 
surrounding New Orleans can't withstand a Category 3 storm in models released by 
the National Hurricane System in the past few weeks (Marshall). This is largely 
because the wetlands that previously acted as buffers to storm surge are now 
underwater, gradually eroded away by canal dredging and the lack of a consistent 
sediment supply. It's as if the Mississippi's engineering and the surrounding bayou 
ecosystem have entered a negative feedback cycle, damaging and outmoding each 
other until the fuse burns out in the delta, and life without the presence of high 
water is no longer possible. 
 This project has covered early stages of that cycle: first, the construction of a 
comprehensive levee system to forever prevent flooding (and replenishment of the 
surrounding wetlands with nutrients and sediment) and the draining of the 
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backswamp to build New Orleans and the plantations snaking along the river 
northward. Second, the realization that a levees-only system was unsustainable – 
worsening the flood cycle, most evident in the great flood of 1927. This disaster 
enabled the formation of the Mississippi River Commission and its new vision of 
Project Flood, a network of interconneced structures (floodways, diversions, weirs 
and dams) that would forever protect the major cities of southern Louisiana. Chief 
among them was Old River Control, a sill with the sole purpose of keeping the 
Mississippi River from redirecting down the Atchafalaya, preserving its current 
course in perpetuity.  
 All these stages of controlling the river share that common ambition: to 
function as a kind of time machine, to break the clock of Louisiana's ecology in the 
mid-1900s. Or, in the USACE's military terminology, to win the war against the river, 
subdue and domesticate it into a well-behaved channel whose high spring waters 
are predictable and able to be accomodated. The implicit missions: to keep New 
Orleans a major port city and fuel its economy. To keep afloat the oil and gas 
industries which employ such a large population of the southern parishes, but 
funnel their money to offices in the north, out of state and local hands. The 
compound effects of these landscape technologies – large-scale urban and rural 
subsidence, the flooding of ancestral lands and displacement of graves and fishing 
grounds, among others – are not their responsibility.  
 It is altogether too easy to demonize the Army Corps for their many failures: 
the failure to properly maintain the walls of New Orleans' outfall canals before 
Katrina hit, though they had been inspected and known to be in poor condition, the 
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failure to include coastal communities like l'Isle de Jean-Charles within their 
updated levee system. Many of these failures are markers merely of an extremely 
small budget which is still shrinking. As Campanella put it to me, even a modest 
settlement from the oil companies up against John Barry would only "pay for the 
paperclips" in a series of coastal restoration projects costing several billion dollars 
over a century. Even then, the coast will never be the same as it was in the time of 
Basil Hall, Elisée Reclus, Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville, or any witnesses of the Big 
Muddy when its nickname actually applied. It will be protected by human-
constructed barrier islands harboring a network of intricately planned wetlands 
supplied sediment by artificial river diversions. The ecological consequences of such 
a profoundly new coastal landscape is still an imaginary – it sometimes seems like 
an attempt to make an enormous diorama of precolonial Louisiana, for which there 
is neither funding or time. I am still not sure what other options exist. 
 It is especially imaginary within the city limits of New Orleans, a walled city 
that forgets its walls are there. However, this year – 2015 – is one of several reality 
checks. It marks the ten-year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina (August 23rd) and 
the five-year anniversary of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (April 20th). Beyond the 
horrendous social and ecological havoc wreaked in the aftermath of both, they were 
events that also rolled back the curtain on many much slower, ongoing disasters. 
Flooding that occurred during Katrina, spread out unequally across the city, 
demonstrated to a tee the kind of environmental racism built into the city's plan 
since its foundation. It showed that lower-income, majority black populations live in 
topographically lower areas of the city, worst affected by both flooding and the 
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damages done by insurance companies on their return, while the higher-income 
"white teapot" (so called for its shape across the cityscape) live along the natural 
levee, and were largely unaffected by floods. The Deepwater Horizon spill shed a 
light on the kind of pollution that petrochemical industries along the Gulf had gotten 
away with for decades (still do) and focused the nation's eye on the growing dead 
zone below the birdfoot delta. Images of oil-coated pelicans and dolphins washed up 
dead on beaches, along with aerials of the Lower Ninth Ward underwater – these 
are now part of the national American narrative of disaster, a train of events in 
Louisiana dating back to the 1927 flood. They are not isolated incidents. They are 
peaks in a sequence of interconnected calamities, which have eaten away at the 
landscape and alienated its inhabitants. Oddly enough, both of them hold some 
allegiance to the few successes and more frequent failures of the river control 
system.  
 Out in the bay, two dredge boats look like yellow houses built on a watery 
plain. From the bottom of the bay they suction sediment, pump it through a thin, 
articulated pipeline across the water and spew it onto a series of jetties constructed 
over a grid. This is how land is built now, more or less. You don't have the right to 
live wherever you want and expect your telephone poles not to erode into the Gulf. 
In small towns, the streets buckle and split along the canal walls. A snag boat tears 
rebar from the broken concrete. One day you're on a speedboat with a man in a 
Saints jersey and an eyepatch. With wide gestures, he points at the portions of open, 
green-blue water which used to be islands he played on as a kid. The heat beats 
down, but you've grown used to it, just like you've grown used to the water and the 
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mosquitoes. I think the thing to fear isn't Louisiana underwater, but something to do 
with vanity, engineering, and the determination to develop no matter what the 
obstacles.  
 There are several small-scale projects that have popped up inside the city 
limits of New Orleans that bring some hope to the larger coastal water issues. Dutch 
Dialogues, a series of conversations with Dutch landscape architects, has turned into 
the Greater New Orleans Water Plan in the past few years, spearheaded by David 
Waggonner of Waggonner and Ball Architects. This plan includes a comprehensive 
revision of New Orleans' drainage system including streetside bioswales, water 
retention basins in empty lots and below-grade trenches to circulate rainwater to 
major pumping stations along the city perimeter. It also has plans to revitalize major 
outfall canals as blueways that basically serve as public parks, part of its idea to 
create a city-wide network of bicycle, running and walking thruways (reducing the 
number of NOLA residents using personal cars to commute). Due to lack of funding, 
the plan has turned into an educational phase with Waggonner and Ball partners 
getting piecemeal funding for each project – the first of these projects to get 
sponsorship, the Lafitte Greenway, opens this summer.  
 Behind all these plans, David Waggonner articulates a larger issue: the failure 
to use waterways in the urban scape of New Orleans creates a kind of city-wide 
psychology that water belongs definitively outside the levee. Why not instead 
circulate it throughout streets and canals, thereby both reducing nuisance flooding 
and the stigma it brings? This seems to be the plan's central tenet: taking a term 
from Timothy Pachirat, to create a new "politics of sight" for New Orleans in which 
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water plays an active role. Establishing water as a part of a citizen's everyday 
routine is more convenient system than relegating it to badly maintained canals 
which inevitably overflow. It's also an implicit, infrastructural reminder of the larger 
context of the city – a place which, in the next century, will have to make some 
serious concessions to deal with land loss. Without the sediment trapped in 
spillways and dams to the north, with all the dredged canals, it is quickly returning 
to its watery origins.  
  What these micro-plans (in New Orleans) and macro-plans (along the 
Louisiana coast) share in common is a vision of a hybridized relationship between 
human life and the delta. Perhaps idealistic, and definitely lacking the financial 
support they need to be realized, they propose that river control (and infrastructure 
in general) should actually start resembling the ecology it reconfigures. This is a 
form of accomodation much larger than Bonnet Carré, Morganza or Wax Lake, 
which function as spigots in which the river's "fury" can be let out by federal 
mandate. It requires that river control actually replicate controlled floods on a much 
larger scale, keep its floodwaters inside city boundaries rather than pumping it out, 
and distribute sediment with data-conscious "pods" like Cantrell's – this is a cyborg 
dreamland. People are struggling to keep the pilings supporting their homes from 
rotting. 
 Leaving New Orleans is always an unhappy event. Taking the on-ramp to I-
10, cruising past the Superdome and the Bonnet Carré Spillway on Lake 
Pontchartrain, over all the protective layers the city has congealed, and out into the 
expanse of watery terrain and cypresses, it is startling how stranded the city is. Way 
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out here, in the middle of a deltaic plain that is disintegrating away. This transition 
startling even the fourth or fifth time driving away from the city. After that, it's 
depressing.  
 Like in the Eames film "Powers of Ten," my mind's eye always telescopes 
upward over the state from my own moving car. From above, so much is clearer 
given a little history: the long-lot agricultural plots dating back to antecedent 
cadaster planning for sugar plantations, trailing along the river like a spine, and the 
surrounding bayous with their knotted strings of Cajun towns. To the west, the 
Atchafalaya Basin laid out wide and green with the Morganza Floodway and Old 
River Control at its peak – such comparatively small and simple structures to 
generate such an epic landscape over half a century. Then there is the river itself, 
which is always slightly out of reach, like a drainage channel in the city – its 
container ships and fish kills and oil-slicked surface, its cottonwoods, giant reeds 
and shores that are muddy where they haven't been overlaid with concrete 
mattresses. I would like not to be romantic or to yearn for a deltaic system that's 
unattainable. I would like to live in this place for as long as it's here. This is a way of 
starting. 
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Appendix: Additional Photos, January 2015. 
 
 
1. Bridge at Crescent Park (2013), Bywater neighborhood. 
 
 
2. Water's edge at Crescent Park. 
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3. Bayou St. John, the original portage of Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville, 1699. 
 
 
4. Scant reeds at Bayou St. John today. 
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5. Shell oil refinery in Norco, LA. 
 
 
6. Bonnet Carré Spillway (1930). Norco, LA. 
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7. Kenta Canal in Barataria Preserve, probably a logging canal from the early 1900s. 
 
 
8. Oil remnants in the wetlands at Barataria Preserve. 
90 
 
 
 
9. Post-Katrina lakeshore pumping station at 17th Ave. Canal, New Orleans. 
 
 
10. Stone levee at Bucktown Harbor on Lake Pontchartrain, New Orleans. 
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11. Trash along the interior of a guide levee at Orleans Ave. Canal, New Orleans. 
 
 
12. Construction of a new lakeshore pumping station at Orleans Ave. Canal, New Orleans. 
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13. Near-empty drainage canal in Broadmoor neighborhood, New Orleans. 
 
 
14. Model of canals and pumping stations in New Orleans at Waggonner & Ball Architects. 
 
93 
 
 
15. Flood / rainwater drainage at Fort Jackson, Plaquemines Parish. 
 
 
16. USACE pipeline dredging project at a harbor in Plaquemines Parish.  
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